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Terrorism in National and International
Law
Caleb M. Pilgrim*
I. In Defense of the Partisans: "Terrorism in National and Interna-
tional Law"
A. General Remarks
In analyzing this topic, one might justifiably ask at the outset
"Why defend the partisans?" They have no need for such defense.
They can and will always speak for themselves. As Camus once
pointed out: "What these fighters . . . did do, they did in fact
against men, and you know at what cost. They will do it again, no
doubt, when any terror confronts them, whatever face it may as-
sume, for terror has several faces."'
Terror, then, breeds resistance. Resistance, in turn, generates
oppression. Terrorism, as we know it today, is often but a feature of
armed resistance. It is in terms of human experience, as old and as
varied as history itself, whether in the guise of irregular warfare,
such as Fabius Cunctator harassing Hannibal's superior forces from
the rear, or in the form of the more recent Stalinist Purges and Eu-
ropean fascism. Historically, it seems standard practice, from the
French Revolution's Reign of Terror, to the institution of slavery, to
the slave revolts (the counterpart of slavery, as by Toussaint
L'Ouverture, Dessalines2 Gabriel Prosser, Denmark Vesey, Nat Tur-
ner, and John Brown), to the resistance against Nazi Germany, and
even today, in the struggle for self-determination and independence
in South Africa by the African National Congress (ANC) and the
Pan-African Congress (PAC). It is a practice common to the politi-
cal individual, the group and the State alike.
Terrorism is a levelling influence in a situation of armed ine-
quality.' It is self-defense by means of intermediate technology in a
* Ph.D (Cantab.); J.D. (Yale); Adjunct Professor of Political Science, Southern Con-
necticut State University and Albertus Magnus College, New Haven, CT.
1. Camus, Letter to Roland Barthes on the subject of THE PLAGUE, ALBERT CAMUS:
LYRICAL AND CRITICAL ESSAYS 340 (P. Thody ed. 1968).
2. See C.L.R. James, THE BLACK JACOBINS (2d ed. 1963).
3. It is not quite a "phenomenon apart from the world's experience"; 61 N.Y.U. L. REV.
654 n. 108 (1986). As indicated elsewhere: "The group whose name gives us our word for
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situation devoid of military parity, while advanced technology re-
mains among the prerogatives of Government. Internally, it is a
function of north-south relations within the particular society lacking
successful democracy." Externally, it reflects the gap between north
and south, and the efforts by the dispossessed to overthrow those
whom they consider their oppressors. For all this, it leaves us with a
feeling of uneasiness. It strikes a note of despair in an age of uncer-
tainty. It reminds us of a Greek tragedy, inspires in us both terror
and pity, and underlines the transcendence of the tragic sense in
life.5 It is sadly an integral part of the Zeitgeist of our times.
assassin arose in Persia about 900 years ago and later flourished in Syria. The Assassins recog-
nized that a tiny group of men prepared to die during their attack could paralyze a larger foe
and that the fear of such attacks could give them power beyond their size . . . . During the
Napoleonic wars, partisan forces pushed carts laden with explosives into the ranks of soldiers,
causing significant damage. By the late nineteenth century, the telegraphic newspapers, and
rising literacy led Russian anarchists to recognize the shock value of violence. They referred to
the terrorist attacks as "propaganda by deed." L. Paul Bremer, III, Counterterrorism: Strat-
egy and Tactics Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 88, No. 2130, January 1988, at 47.
Another writer, Fromkin, described terrorism as "political ju-jitsu." Just as the ju-jitsu
master dodged his assailant's blow to throw the assailant, so the terrorist aimed to turn the
power of the state against itself. Fromkin, The Strategy of Terrorism, CONTEMPORARY TER-
RORISM: SELECTED READINGS (Elliot & Gibson ed. 1978).
4. Radical action has sprung up in the poorest areas of India, particularly in Bihar and
Andra Pradesh, areas where feudal landholding patterns and caste burdens are especially se-
vere. The kidnapping and murders of policemen and supernumeraries of the rich landlords are
mirrored by the official campaign to liquidate the "terrorists." See Kidnapping by Extremists
Stir India, N.Y. Times, Jan. 3, 1988. See also, Tough Indian Security laws draw fire from
civil rights groups, Christian Sci Mon, Sept. 8, 1987 at 14.
5. Our fears run the gamut from whether terrorists will eventually obtain nuclear weap-
ons and trigger some holocaust to whether there will be a shortage of vegetables and fruit
following a terrorist explosion in the proposed tunnel linking the U.K. and Europe. See Parker,
"Letters," The Economist, Oct. 24, 1987, and Hall's reply, "Letters," The Economist, Nov.
21, 1987. Undoubtedly, terrorist activity has been both egregious and disturbing. But it is still
a far cry from Murphy's exaggeration that:
The random nature of terrorist targeting and timing further increases pub-
lic anxiety. No person or target is safe, and an attack may come at any time of
the day or night . . . . Many transnational business corporations have drasti-
cally increased their expenditures on security measures and ransom insurance.
Air travellers are subjected to luggage screening and magnetometers, adding to
the cost and time of travelling. Because of the threat of bombing, lockers have
been removed from transportation terminals. Threats of bombing have also re-
sulted in barricades at foreign ministries or legislative bodies. Embassies in some
troubled areas of the world resemble fortresses, with the consequence that diplo-
macy is grievously impaired.
These costs could escalate considerably should terrorists continue to be will-
ing to inflict great loss of life. Experts disagree on the ability of terrorists to use
such methods of "technological terrorism" as nuclear material or chemical or
biological weapons. But the technology is available, and the risk is therefore real.
Murphy, Recent International Developments in Controlling International Terrorism, 4 CHI-
NESE Y.B. INT'L L. & AFFAIRS 99 (1984).
But terrorist incidents have declined since 1982. In 1982 there were fifty-one reported
incidents in the U.S. In 1987 there were seven reported incidents. Even as late as October
1988 none had been reported. In fact, by late 1987, L. Paul Bremer III, Ambassador-at-large
for Counterterrorism, confidently asserted that:
• . . in 1986, terrorism dropped 6%. So far in 1987, it is down another
10%. The decline would be greater but for Afghan-sponsored terrorism in Paki-
stan. Contrary to the impression many Americans have, terrorism in Europe
dropped dramatically last year - over 33%. And in 1986, there were only two
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Yet the Free Poles, the Free Czechs, the Free French and those
who resisted during the Second World War have never been de-
scribed as "terrorists." Their courage, never denied; their more spec-
tacular successes, never demeaned as the mindless barbarities of
some criminal fringe. Their heroism, has, in fact, been universally
recognized. Nor have the Argentine generals or their Chilean coun-
terparts ever been derided as "terrorists," notwithstanding their re-
lentless butchery of legitimate opposition and democratic protests.
On the contrary, it has been argued that the nature of these regimes,
properly understood, is destined to yield democratic forms." Military
dictatorships are the pathway to democracy. Ironically, however, al-
most all such experiments in Latin American democracy have been
so far notoriously short-lived. They have all, with piteously few ex-
ceptions, died aborning.
The courtesy given the Free French, Free Poles and the like has,
paradoxically, never been extended to contemporary movements en-
gaged in sometimes no less heroic resistance against neo-fascist, au-
thoritarian, totalitarian and even genocidal regimes. The semantics
of terror have been at best selective, at worst, dishonest. This article
seeks to restore something of the original and proper meaning of the
terms "terrorists" and "terrorism" and to distinguish between phe-
nomena elsewhere described as "retail" and "wholesale" terror., For
it is the indisputable fact that in contemporary social and political
thought, the terrorist signifies the individual embittered, the dissi-
dent, the uprooted and even the demented. At least, such is the offi-
cial story. By peculiar historical travesty, the victim has become the
accused, the innocent has become the guilty, the aggrieved has been
branded the aggressor. To many, as to Alice's Humpty Dumpty,
words, regrettably, mean what we choose them to mean.'
Public figures, politicians, scholars and journalists, all acqui-
esced in a shift of meaning of terrorism which served the interests of
government propaganda. Bizarre as it may seem, to seek to realize or
to defend one's freedom led almost automatically in some circum-
airline hijackings, the lowest number . . . over 20 years ....
Counterterrorism: US Policy and Proposed Legislation, Department of State Bulletin, Vol.
88, No. 2130, January 1988, at 44. Statement before the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcot-
ics, and International Operations of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on October 15,
1987.
6. Horowitz, 3 THIRD WORLD QUARTERLY, 38-39.
7. N. CHOMSKY, THE WASHINGTON CONNECTION AND THIRD WORLD FASCISM: THE PO-
LITICAL ECONOMY OF HUMAN RIGHTS 6 (1979), and THE CULTURE OF TERRORISM (1988).
8. "But tell me your name and your business" said Humpty!
"My name is Alice, but -"
"It's a stupid name enough!" Humpty Dumpty interrupted impatiently. "What does it mean?"
"Must a name mean something?" Alice asked doubtfully.
"Of course it must." Humpty said with a short laugh: "My name means the shape I am -
and a good handsome shape it is, too. With a name like yours, you might be any shape,
almost." L. CARROLL, COMPLETE WORKS 192 (1973).
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stances to being labelled a terrorist, a development strikingly at odds
with tenets of the western philosophical tradition. Indeed, the cry of
"terrorism" was often raised as a shield against accusations of wide-
spread torture and human rights violations by the Latin American
generals in particular.9
Terrorism as defined by the Oxford English Dictionary refers
among other things to "a policy intended to strike with terror those
against whom it is adopted; the employment of methods of intimida-
tion; the fact of terrorizing or condition of being terrorized."'" In
modern use, the term usually referred to membership in a clandes-
tine or expatriate organization aiming to coerce an established gov-
ernment by acts of violence against it or its subjects. Webster's de-
fines it as "the use of terror and violence to intimidate, subjugate,
etc," and "systematic use of terror as a means of coercion."" Until
recently, however, corrupt usage largely omitted governments as
agents of terror, even though governments were responsible for most
acts of terrorism. Moreover, it did not matter whether the governing
international law standard was that of the "civilized nation" or that
of the "peace loving nation," for the architects of both standards
used terror as an instrument of their statecraft when the situation
dictated use of such an expedient.
However, popular and practical definitions generally focused on
individuals and groups. 2 : The PLO, the Red Brigades, the Baader
Meinhof, the Red Army, and the Tupamaros invariably monopolized
9. See 1977 OAS GeneralAssembly, Grenada. Also, Secretary of State Haig in his
first press conference on the future intentions of the Reagan Administration: ". . . interna-
tional terrorism will take the place of human rights in our concern because it is the ultimate
abuse of human rights," quoted in Friedlander, United States Policy Towards Armed Rebel-
lion, Y.B. OF WORLD AFFAIRS 39 (1983).
10. XI THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 216 (1933).
11. WEBSTER'S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY, (2nd ed. 1985).
12. "People in every corner of the world have suffered from acts of terrorism committed
by individuals and groups from varied political perspectives and every conceivable ethnic back-
ground known to man." Statement by George William Crockett, Jr., U.S. Representative to
the 42nd Session of the UNGA, in Sixth Committee, on item 126, measures to prevent inter-
national Terrorism, October 26, 1987. R. LILLICH, TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM: CONVEN-
TIONS AND COMMENTARY xiii, n.l, uses the term "terrorism" for "linguistic convenience to
cover the host of acts made criminal by the national law of most states, as well as certain acts
- such as aerial hijacking - specifically made criminal by international agreements." Lil-
lich's usage merely compounds illegitimate and selective use of the term. Ironically, Lord
Diplock's definition of "terrorism" as the "use or threat of violence to achieve political ends"
(Pyle, Defining Terrorism, FOREIGN POLICY 66 (1986)), seems better to convey the essence of
terrorism. Arguably, it is also elastic enough to include governments as terrorists. Diplock's
definition is nonetheless inadequate for it could be read to mean that an act which failed to
coerce could not amount to a terrorist act - a preposterous result. The British Emergency
Legislation definition, "the use of violence for political ends and includes any use of violence
for the purpose of putting the public or any section of the public in fear," (cited in Spillane,
Terrorists and Special Status: The British Experience in Northern Ireland, 9 HASTINGS INT'L
COMP. L. REV. 489 n.51 (1985-86)) is perhaps more useful. Our approach rather is that a
terrorist act is to be defined according to (i) the intention of the sponsor, (ii) the nature of the
act itself, and (iii) the effects of the act.
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the headlines. As such, writings which took as their point of depar-
ture the individual as the master terrorist were off to a flying start."3
Yet, it was a false start. The starter's gun had misfired. The terms
had been loaded with the wrong connotations. The situation easily
originated because nothing raises the hackles like terrorism. Carlos,
the Jackal, Black September, Abu Nidal and other legendary figures
in the folklore of contemporary terrorism helped magnify the pre-
vailing misconception. The focus on terrorist acts by individuals and
groups served as a decoy, effectively distracting attention from other
sources of terror, namely, the security forces of government.
In a sense, the 1950s and 1960s highlighted a different question:
that of state terrorism. The activities of the French in Algeria and
the United States in Vietnam support this proposition. This feature
of terrorism, however, seems almost hidden by contemporary conven-
tions, arising in the aftermath of the wave of terrorism, which took
place in the 1970s and eventually led to near universal acceptance of
"international terrorism" as a crime, however defined. As such, the
Washington Convention" stemmed from a desire on the part of the
United States to prevent future assassinations of its representatives
in Latin America; air piracy by the Palestinians led to the Hague 5
and Montreal Conventions; 6 public outrage at the terrorist activities
of the Baader-Meinhof in the Federal Republic of Germany was the
source of inspiration for the European Convention on the Suppres-
sion of Terrorism 17 and the Dublin Agreement,' 8 as well as the 1979
United Nations Agreement."
Just as a victims rights movement demanded redress for victims
at the domestic level, states injured by terrorism called for a re-
sponse within the framework of public international law. The impor-
tance of the victims coincided with an apparent rise in the level of
international consciousness, to the effect that terrorism became a
13. See. e.g., Y. MELMAN, THE MASTER TERRORIST: THE TRUE STORY OF ABU NIDAL
(1986). Recent work by Rivers, Netanyahu and others are more prescriptive in orientation, but
lack both historical dimension and cogent intellectual analysis of the causes of terrorism.
14. The OAS Convention on the Prevention and Repression of Acts of Terrorism, Wash-
ington, February 2, 1971.
15. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, done at The Hague,
Dec. 16, 1970 (1971), 22 U.T.S. 1641, T.I.A.S. No. 7192, 10 I.L.M. 133 (1971) [hereinafter
cited as The Hague Convention].
16. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Avia-
tion, done at Montreal, Sept. 23, 1971 (1973), 24 U.S.T. 565, T.I.A.S. No. 7570, 10 I.L.M.
1151 (1971).
17. European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, (with Explanatory Report)
Strasbourg, Jan. 27, 1977, Misc. No. 28 (1977), HMSO Cmnd. 7031, also reprinted in 15
1.L.M. 1272 (1976) entered into force Oct. 26, 1978; see also n.30 infra.
18. The Agreement on the Application of the European Convention for the Suppression
of Terrorism (the Dublin Agreement), 19 I.L.M. 325 (1980).
19. International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp.
(no. 39) at 23, U.N. Doc. A/34/39 (1979), reprinted in 18 I.L.M. 1456 (1979).
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"crime of international concern."20 The Washington Convention thus
referred in Article 2 to a "crime of international interest."21 The
Hostages Convention referred in its Preamble to "a delict gravely
worrying to the international community. ' 2 The rule of law would
cement cooperation among "peace-loving" states and those opposed
to terrorism. Ideally, it would be invoked in the name of all. In real-
ity, it would be for the protection of a few.
The conventions agreed in substance on the need to punish ter-
rorism. At the same time, they ignored its causes and possible pre-
vention. The idea of "prevention" adumbrated in the 1937 League of
Nations text was absent from subsequent texts unless United Na-
tions General Assembly resolutions made reference to it. Here, the
emphasis was on "elimination," as in General Assembly Resolution
40/61 .23 Affirming the criminal character of terrorism allowed for
common policy. It was a matter of principle to discredit an ill-de-
fined activity, so that there could be no excuses. Assimilating terror-
ism with odious criminality facilitated this outcome, since domestic
law retained this category. In'this way, specific legislative proposals
and extradition practices joined up with international condemnation
of terrorism.
Terrorism thus took its place in the lexicon of contemporary
"isms," along with capitalism, imperialism, colonialism, marxism,
and communism. The impressionism and ideology of the more con-
servative led them to maintain that terrorism was akin to nihilism, or
an incorrigible feature of totalitarian communism. Reality, however,
seemed to suggest otherwise. For terrorism is as much a feature of
communist regimes as it is of capitalist regimes or of anarchists,
communists and assorted revolutionaries of ill will and wicked dispo-
sition. It is, like democracy, an element in the make-up of regimes,24
whether of the left or the right. It can increase or decrease as cir-
cumstances demand. Maitre Verges is not entirely wrong when he
suggests that Klaus Barbie's work against resistance fighters in Lyon
was similar to that of French soldiers fighting against Algerians dur-
ing the war for Algerian independence in the 1950s.25 However, per-
petration of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and use of terror
whether by Germans in Occupied Europe, by Americans in Vietnam
or by Russians in Afghanistan, have no value as precedent. None of
20. AGO, Recueil 1972-1 at 12.
21. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
22. See infra p.8 & note 36.
23. 39 U.N.Y.B. 1167-1170 (1985).
24. A. MILLER, THE SECRET CONSTITUTION AND THE NEED FOR CONSTITUTIONAL
CHANGE 2-3 (1987).




these gruesome adventures justifies or excuses the use of such meth-
ods. The torture and murder of members of a resistance movement
are thus usually treated as war crimes. Clearly, genocide is a crime
against humanity. How then did governments, in light of their sover-
eign butchery of legitimate protest and democratic opposition, come
for so long to escape the pejorative description of "terrorist?" How
did the pejorative connotations come about? What purpose did pejo-
rative designation serve? What happened when yesterday's terrorists
seized the instruments of state and in some cases continued to perpe-
trate the most appalling atrocities?
Perhaps, the focus on acts of terrorism perpetrated by the indi-
vidual or group was a function of two things: one, a measure of the
readiness to accept the plea of sovereign immunity; and two, the
compelling nature of arguments as to Executive privilege in the area
of national security. Yet, it is still not clear that either of these rep-
resents justification adequate to confer on the State the aura of
moral authority and superiority in circumstances where individual
acts, qualitatively the same, are readily classifiable as "criminal"
and treated accordingly.
In another vein, terrorism in the more recent individualist sense
may be related to voluntarist tradition,2 the convention of the man
of action whose activism represents a potent antidote to complacent
mediocrity; a state of affairs different, even if in motivational terms
alone, from government's relations with the governed. To assert as
much is to raise, albeit indirectly, the questions concerning the legiti-
macy and scope of the State's rights and duties in relation to its
nationals. The terrorist individually is but the child of despair. Gov-
ernments for their part have no such alibi. Whereas the actions of
terrorists are ultimately intended to revolutionize or overthrow the
system, the actions of governments by and large are deliberate, cal-
culated to preserve the status quo or even return things to the status
quo ante.17 State sponsored terrorism is thus inherently reactionary.
It would preserve for the oligarchs of today the benefits of yesterday.
For the dissident groups which resort to terrorism, the objective is
more often than not the redistribution of political power, a new or-
der, a new day in the life of the miserably oppressed. For the victims
come to sadness of sacrifice on the altar of competing ideologies.
Notably, the government still has in its armory many formida-
ble weapons. It alone controls the armed forces and the police.
Often, however, it is the armed forces which control both the govern-
ment and the police. It alone has a de facto monopoly over fire
26. See Radu, Terror, Terrorism, and Insurgency in Latin America, 28 ORBIS 27, 29
(1984).
27. Pol Pot's Cambodia provides an obvious example.
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power. Yet, its resources are not confined to the quantum of arms
and military expertise. For it can, as constant practice shows, ulti-
mately take over even the media and use it for its own interests. All
of this, potentially a monstrous state of affairs, represents a source of
satisfaction for those who would employ terror and make others dis-
appear, and a source of despair to those who endure it.
It is perhaps testimony to the strength of the media, and per-
haps ironically to a cherished attachment to the First Amendment
that some writers have been led to believe that publicity is the main,
if not the sole goal of terrorists.2 8 One may believe that a society
conditioned to believe in the First Amendment, freedom of informa-
tion, a powerful press often referred to as the Fourth Estate -
strong enough to bring down President Nixon as a result of the
Watergate scandal and destroy the aspiration of Presidential
hopefuls - would be induced to believe that terrorists are motivated
solely by desire for'self-advertisement. This, as demonstrated below,
is simply false.
At least one writer, Hazelip,29 has, however, tried to determine
the unity in the principles of terrorists, and their adherence to the
same principles, through analysis of the statements of prominent ter-
rorist leaders, ranging from Bakunin to Marighella. Those twelve
principles are as follows:
i) Violence is necessary to overthrow oppression.
ii) There is no limit to the extent of violence justified.
iii) Actions should clearly convey their purpose.
iv) Reprisal killings are counterproductive.
v) Ruthlessness and extraordinary violence are essential to
terrorist success.
vi) Government failures can be used to gain popular
support.
vii) Terrorism exposes the repressive side of government.
viii) Terrorists aim to incapacitate government directly or
indirectly.
ix) Secrecy is important to terrorist operations.
x) Systematic planning and execution are critical to terror-
ist success.
xi) Small-scale, persistent attacks are most effective.
xii) Terrorists are dedicated to destruction for the sake of
their cause."0
28. See note 88 infra.
29. A. HAZELIP, TWELVE TENETS OF TERRORISM: AN ASSESSMENT OF THEORY AND
PRACTICE (1980), quoted in Ferracuti, Theories of Terrorism, INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM





These objectives are not all mutually compatible. Rationales
will also differ. However, to summarize, it would seem that the
methods chosen, the impact felt - these two factors above all -
determine the identity of terrorists. As such, a police force, an army
of occupation, or military and paramilitary forces, can by their cho-
sen methods and by their impact, constitute a terrorist group or a
group manned by terrorists pretending to act in the name of "law
and order," or even to uphold "democracy."
Two basic paradigms have evolved from the study of terrorism.
The first sees terrorism as a species of military war. It is premised on
strategic deterrence. The objective is to neutralize the terrorists by
unsettling the center of gravity of their organizations. Offensive war
denies terrorists the advantages of: (1) surprise; (2) cohesion; (3)
morale; (4) recruitment; and (5) readiness of capability. The ter-
rorists who must concentrate on survival, upon becoming neutralized,
cannot succeed with propaganda by deed.
The second paradigm sees terrorism as a crime, a problem of
law enforcement. Apprehension and punishment represent the basic
goals of law enforcement and the government's policy on terrorism.
A familiar response runs as follows:
Terrorists are criminals. They commit criminal actions like
murder, kidnapping and arson, and countries have laws to pun-
ish criminals. So a major element of our strategy has been to
delegitimize terrorists, to get society to see them for what they
are - criminals - and to use democracy's most potent tool, the
rule of law, against them.3'
It not clear what is meant here by the "rule of law." According
to Dicey's formulation of the concept, it originally meant "the abso-
lute supremacy or predominance of regular law as opposed to the
influence of arbitrary power" and "excluded the existence of arbi-
trariness, of prerogative, or even of wide discretionary authority on
the part of the government."32 It follows ex hypothesi that cases
may arise in which the "existence of arbitrariness, of prerogative and
wide discretionary authority on the part of the government," will
sometimes cause the governed and those labelled "terrorists" to be-
come on occasion de facto champions of the rule of law.
It is not argued here that desirable ends always justify abomina-
ble means. Nor do we seek to promote here some terrorist's charter.
Instead, the argument is that terrorism in self-defense, or as self-
help, or reprisal may sometimes be legitimate. But even as self-de-
31. Bremer, supra note 3 at 48.
32. A. DICEY, LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 202 (10th ed. 1952), quoted in R. HEUSTON,
ESSAYS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 34 (1964).
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fense or as reprisal, the terrorist response is more often than not pos-
sibly too feeble to meet threshold requirements of proportionality,
compulsion and immediacy under national and international law. It
is at best inchoate by nature. In most other circumstances, it will
lack legitimacy. Success ultimately means, however, that yesterday's
terrorists invariably become today's statesmen. Mr. Sadat, Mr. Be-
gin33 and Mr. MacBride illustrate the fact that former terrorists are
often the Nobel laureates of today. The annals of British imperialism
are replete with examples of "terrorists" from Kenya, Israel, Egypt,
Ireland, and elsewhere, who, initially detained at Her Majesty's
pleasure because of their nationalist political activities, were invaria-
bly released to become the Heads of State or ambassadors of newly
self-governing and independent nations. The better, perhaps more re-
alist approach, therefore, seems to be that the attitude to terrorism
is, at most, a function of our changing conceptions of what is morally
acceptable.
Ronald Reagan's genius, though it may have abysmally mis-
judged the contras and labelled them "freedom fighters," neverthe-
less correctly perceived the downing of the South Korean civilian air-
craft (the KAL) when it strayed into Soviet airspace as an example
of "state terrorism." Branding a fellow Permanent Member of the
Security Council as a terrorist held out the possibility that other gov-
ernments, including that of the United States itself, when acting
with similar insensitivity and disregard for humanitarian concerns,
should be rightly judged as terrorist or terroristic in light of the uni-
versal horror deeply felt at such an appalling act.
B. The Problem Stated
A number of difficulties have attended attempts to reach a uni-
versally accepted legal definition of terrorism. First, most definitions
have employed words such as "fear," "intimidation," "subjugation,"
"coercion," thereby proving themselves incapable of defining terror-
ism is a generic term, encompassing a multitude of acts involving
33. See A. SADAT, IN SEARCH OF IDENTITY: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY (1979). Also, in the
words of one observer,
Mr. Begin was the leader of the terrorist underground before the establish-
ment of the state of Israel. He could be remembered for the Camp David peace
treaty he signed with Egypt; but his reputation is stamped indelibly with the acts
of violence he helped to initiate; the massacre by his underground colleagues of
the Arab villagers of Dir Yassin; the blowing up of the King David Hotel and its
occupants in 1946; the bombing of Iraq's nuclear reactor in 1981. As Prime
Minister in 1982, he led Israel into Zionism's nemesis: the invasion of Lebanon
and the massacre - by Christian Arabs but in areas the Israeli army claimed to
control - of hundreds of Palestinian civilians at Sarba and Shatila.
The Fable of the Three Giants of Zion, THE ECONOMIST, August 29, 1987, at 81. The Holo-
caust had given Israel a moral blank cheque. The achievement of Mr. Begin an his successors
may have been to squander this moral blank cheque so fortuitously provided.
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terror and violence. Third, terrorism is only distinctive as method, a
way of carrying out a criminal act by terror, violence, intimidation, a
fact which often leads to confusion of the method with the infraction
itself. Finally, repeated failure to reach an agreed definition demon-
strates the difficult nature of international cooperation in general.
Any international agreement in the fight against terrorism must, in a
world community marked by heterogeneity and diversity of interests,
inevitably offend the sensitivities of some states, hold out the pros-
pect of infringing on their national sovereignty, and in domestic
terms possibly even violate well-established civil rights.
Attempts at defining the concepts of terrorism and political asy-
lum date back to the eighteenth century. It was, however, only dur-
ing the 1830s that the principle of the non-extraditable political of-
fense was finally expressed in legislation in Switzerland, Belgium,
France, Britain and the United States, enshrining in the national law
of these states the political offense exception to extradition.
In his course before the Hague Academy in 1925, Quintilliano
Saldana introduced the category of the "international crime" and
included in it, crimes against international law and against the rights
of people, and crimes committed against Heads of Foreign States or
their diplomatic representatives. 4 Subsequently, some of the authors
of the draft agreement on the prevention and repression of terrorism
- completed by the League of Nations in 1937 - considered "ter-
rorism" as a crime from the standpoint of international law, damag-
ing to the heritage and birthright of the international community.
Nonetheless, international agreement on a legal regime governing
extradition for what were essentially political offenses proved diffi-
cult to attain.
The 1937 Convention, drafted after the assassinations of King
Alexander of Yugoslavia and Dr. Dollfuss, the Austrian Chancellor,
was eventually abandoned along with suggestions for an interna-
tional criminal court.3 5 The Convention, like more recent attempts at
reaching an international agreement on terrorism, floundered be-
cause of the inability of states to agree on a definition of a "political
crime" and to determine what exactly constituted a "terrorist" act.
Since that time, the problem of defining "terrorism" has re-
mained a major stumbling block in the way of reaching international
agreement on terrorism. All attempts to agree on a definition have
failed. In practice, it has proved impossible to separate terrorism
34. Saldana, La Justice penale internationale V Recueil des Cours 285, 287-95, 296 et
seq., 336-45 (1925). Cf. Hudson, The Proposed International Criminal Court, AJIL 549, 551
n.6 (1938).
35. Proceedings of the International Conference on the Repression of Terrorism (Series
of League of Nations Publications C.94.M 47, Legal V.3, 1938).
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from the legitimate activities of national liberation movements. At
the 41st session of the United Nations General Assembly, delegates
again skirted the problem of definition. The result was a description
of acts to be prohibited, without defining terrorism as such. An ear-
lier exercise, the European Convention on the Suppression of Terror-
ism (1977), similarly made no attempt to define terrorism or the
concept of the "political offense." The subject of the Convention,
therefore, remained undefined.36 Evidently, the problem of defining
terrorism was, and is not, solved by ignoring it as some insist.
37
Rather, the peculiar absence of a definition left a psychological
blackhole - a state of affairs congenial to connotation of mindless-
ness and irrationality which are the popular conceptions of terrorism.
This definitional problem is not simply a question of one man's
terrorist being another's freedom fighter, like some trick effect in a
hall of mirrors, our position depending on where we stand. Repeated
failure to reach an agreed definition demonstrates the difficult nature
of international cooperation in general, and in the fight against ter-
rorism in particular. Any international agreement in a world com-
munity, marked by heterogeneity and diversity of interests, must in-
evitably offend the sensitivities of some states; hold out the prospect
of infringing on their national sovereignty; and possibly violate estab-
lished traditions of civil and political rights. For example, Italy cur-
tailed civil liberties in attempting to stop the Red Brigades. Some
proposals have often resulted in problems for civil liberties groups
and many constituents oppose legislation based on their fears of a
reduction in their rights against search and seizure, muzzling of the
press, and problems involving due process or equal protection.
36. Article I of the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism provided
that:
For the purposes of extradition between Contracting States, none of the fol-
lowing offences shall be regarded as a political offence or as an offence con-
nected with a political offence or as an offence inspired by political motives:
(a) an offence within the scope of the Convention for the Suppression
of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, signed at The Hague on 16 December
1970;
(b) an offence within the scope of the Convention for the Suppres-
sion of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, signed at
Montreal on 23 September 1971;
(c) a serious offence involving an attack against the life, physical
integrity or liberty of internationally protected persons, including diplo-
matic agents;
(d) an offence involving kidnapping, the taking of a hostage or seri-
ous unlawful detention;
(e) an offence involving the use of a bomb, grenade, rocket, auto-
matic firearm or letter or parcel bomb if this use endangers persons;
(f) an attempt to commit any of the foregoing offences or participa-
tion as an accomplice of a person who commits or attempts to commit
such an offence.




Political discourse tends to blur differences. Notwithstanding
this, an international double standard clearly exists with respect to
terrorism. As such, the Afghan guerrillas viewed from Washington
have been labelled "resisters;" in El Salvador, the guerrillas have
been labelled "agents of subversion;" in Nicaragua, they are "free-
dom fighters," and in Reagan's words the "moral equivalent of the
Founding Fathers."38
A major problem with blanket terms such as "terrorist" and
"terrorism" is that they alter the distinctions between political action
and criminal offenses, and between neofascist and extremist groups
and "legitimate" groups internationally recognized as striving for
self-determination. Political motive has always been an element of
terrorism, and many acts would appear at first sight eligible for the
political offense exception. The task remains to distinguish between
"freedom fighters" and "terrorists;" "revolutionaries" and
"terrorists."
Many misconceptions, myths and illusions remain. Conse-
quently, it has remained difficult to formulate a general rule as to
what constitutes a "protected" act as opposed to an "extraditable"
act. Perhaps, increased attention and studies as to how information
is processed with regard to terrorism -. its origins and causes; the
intentions of its sponsors; the nature of terrorist activity and the ef-
fects of such acts - might illuminate executive decision and, in
turn, facilitate legislation and adjudication in the area.
C. Historical Overview
It has been suggested that "(a)lthough terrorist tactics often
have accompanied conventional and guerrilla warfare, today's inter-
national terrorism is a distant, significant, and new mode of armed
conflict. Present-day terrorism is a derivative of twentieth century
theories of guerrilla warfare for which Mao Zedong deserves the
most credit."3 9 This argument misstates the problem. First, many
believe that publicity is a major goal of terrorists. Terrorist actions
are often played out in urban settings, taking advantage of the me-
dia's penchant for the sensational and the dramatic. The rural guer-
rilla warfare advocated by Mao Zedong,' ° therefore, has little in
38. NEWSWEEK, January 6, 1986, at 39.
39. Jenkins, New Modes of Conflict, 28 ORRIS 9 (1984). This view is commonplace in
the works of terrorism sponsored by the Rand Corporation. See, e.g., 28 ORBIs 1984. On the
other hand, Sofaer argues that "Terrorists are not soldiers. They don't wear uniforms. They
hide among civilians and, after striking, they try to escape once again into civilian groups
.... "Sofaer, Terrorism and the Law, FOREIGN AFFAIRS 914 (1986). See also Bierzanek,
"Le status juridique des partisans et des mouvements de resistance armee; evolution historique
et aspects actuels," Melanges offerts a Juraj Andrassy (1968) [hereinafter Melanges].
40. Mao Zedung (also spelled Mao Tse-tung) (1893-1976) founder of the Chinese Com-
munist Party and leader of the People's Republic of China for twenty-seven years. See also
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common with contemporary urban terrorism. This does not mean,
however, that guerrilla warfare has not on occasion used terror as an
instrument of policy. Second, the above argument that today's ter-
rorists are heirs to Maoist guerrilla theory, which is premised on
some vague and ill-defined notion of illegal guerrilla warfare, rather
than establishing the illegality of terrorists per se, can perhaps ironi-
cally strengthen terrorist claims to legality, given the fact that guer-
rilla warfare was, and is generally recognized, as licit. As a final
caveat, it is to be noted that attempts to distinguish between "ter-
rorists" and "national liberation movement," "terrorists" and "guer-
rillas," and "guerrillas" and "regular armed forces" often in practice
serve no useful purpose. For, while the objectives of the parties are
not identical, their methodology and much of their essential activity
remains the same. The purported distinctions are therefore in practi-
cal terms, distinctions without a difference; the discussion of "ter-
rorists" and "terrorism" being not so much an independent variable
as part of a wider question, the use of force, of political violence, and
the appropriate means of regulating and restraining these acts.
Assimilation of guerrilla and terrorist methodology has not
helped attempts to regulate either terrorism or guerrilla warfare. A
brief analysis of the history of the guerrilla in public international
law will perhaps reveal that that history does not allow us to con-
clude that the guerrilla or terrorist always lacked legal status.
The difficulties largely stem from the fact that modern conflicts
often have an asymmetric character; for example, a more powerful
belligerent invades a foreign country with the latter supported by
segments of its population decides to resist by organizing guerrilla
forces (Vietnam, Afghanistan). In practice, only one of the parties to
the conflict uses guerrillas, although in recent times regular armies
have tended to deploy small, mobile units which employ similar tac-
tics. Asymmetry makes it difficult to regulate such conflict given that
the rules purporting to govern international war have often empha-
sized the principle of reciprocity. The problem of asymmetry must,
therefore, be taken into account when considering the subject of ter-
rorism when applied to movements for national liberation and popu-
lar resistance, just as it must be taken into account in considering
the laws of war.
From the humanitarian standpoint, it is also important to know
the legal rules to be applied to guerrillas, terrorists and members of
resistance movement. Since the legal status of armed forces con-
forming to existing law is different from that of the civilian popula-
tion, interpretation often poses the following dilemma: must one ac-
Mao Tse-Tung, ON GUERRILLA WARFARE (trans. S.Griffin 1961).
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cord to persons participating in armed resistance - the status of
prisoners of war after their capture - or are they merely to be sub-
jected to the rigors of the existing criminal law and face, as a gen-
eral rule, the possibility of capital punishment as "rebels" or "brig-
ands" in wartime.
History is instructive in two respects. First, the Hague Regula-
tions of 1899 and 1907 and the Conventions of 1949 are not the only
source of law on the legal status of guerrillas and resistance move-
ments. The Preamble of the Fourth Hague Convention provided that
where specific cases escaped the pertinent provision "the inhabitants
and the belligerents remain under the protection and the rule of the
principles of the law of nations, as they result from the usages estab-
lished among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity and the
dictates of the public conscience." '41 It is therefore important to de-
termine the relevant customs, as well as the legal and humanitarian
principles which emerged from international practice and jurispru-
dence. Second, it is important to trace the evolution of relevant law
and practice while taking into account the evolution of military tech-
nology, the gap between legal theory and the practice of war, and
the politics of war during the different historical periods.
1. Guerrilla Warfare Before the Hague Codifica-
tion.-Terrorism and guerrilla warfare, rural or urban, can occur in
a variety of circumstances. These range from the individual bomb-
ing, to intermittent attacks by small units, followed by their immedi-
ate retreat, to regular hostilities involving the use of heavy weaponry.
Armed resistance takes place at different times and at different
levels. For example, during an invasion when guerrilla movements
are formed in occupied territories and operate at the front with the
intention of penetrating the enemy's defenses after arrangement of a
ceasefire, or even after peace has been concluded or annexation de-
clared. Sometimes, such movements have emerged as a response to
colonial conditions.
During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the laws and
customs of war sanctioned the use of guerrillas in war. Small irregu-
lar units loosely connected with the regular army command usually
helped to determine the final outcome. Guerrilla warfare was not ex-
ceptional. In the Middle Ages, monarchs customarily authorized in-
dividuals to seize enemy booty during war on land or at sea. (The
English "hero," Sir Francis Drake, was understandably considered a
"pirate" by his Spanish adversaries).
The practice of war in centuries past, especially during the six-
41. Melanges, supra note 39, at 56.
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teenth century, was certainly far from satisfactory from the humani-
tarian standpoint. However, it made no distinction between belliger-
ents and regular forces, and customs were not so rigid as to preclude
the use of guerrilla forces as a legal means of conducting warfare. It
sufficed that it was public war and that the belligerents were author-
ized by competent authority. Vattel formulated the principle accord-
ing to which the subjects of a belligerent nation were the enemies of
the subjects of the other nations.42 A war should be public, but the
subjects could reasonably presume the will of their sovereign and
consequently act on his tacit command.43 After Vattel, the general
rule prohibited the killing of enemies who had ceased to resist. There
was only one exception: wanton crimes against the law of nations.
Nevertheless, Vattel states the contrary practice concerning peasant
revolts. Some held that the order of the guerrilla leader was suffi-
cient to render his forces legitimate participants in guerrilla war-
fare." Still others were of the view that the subject, who even with-
out the sovereign's authorization, fought in defense of the nation or
in self-defense, could not be treated more harshly than regular
combatants.' 6
Similar opinions as to the legal status of guerrilla forces pre-
vailed at the time of the Napoleonic Wars. In 1813, King Frederick
William III of Prussia issued an ordinance recommending that the
members of the landsturm" not carry any distinguishing mark or
uniform so that they would not be easily recognized by the enemy.
Opinions were divided between various schools: those who held that
the right to wage war could be delegated by the sovereign to corpo-
rations and even to individuals and that these had to be treated in
accordance with the laws of war irrespective of number;"7 those who
held that guerrilla forces taking part in hostilities could only be le-
gitimized by order of the sovereign;' 8 and those who required that
the guerrillas be furnished with a written order by their commander-
in-chief and that they act in conformity with the laws of war.'9
Only at the time of the Holy Alliance did there develop a ten-
dency to discriminate against guerrilla forces. The governments of
the Great Powers, intent on stifling democratic revolutions, main-
tained that only members of the regular armies had the rights of
legitimate belligerents. The so-called Metternich doctrine held that
42. E. Vattel, Le droit des gens, III, V.S. 70, cited in Melanges, supra note 39, at 56.
43. Id. ai 56.
44. Id. at 57.
45. Id.
46. Home Guard or militia.
47. Melanges, supra note 39, at 57.
48. Id. at 57.
49. Id. at 58.
[Vol. 8:2
Winter 1990]
the Greek insurgents were rebels and, therefore, ineligible for the
same rights as the other belligerents.5"
Nineteenth century United States practice in this area was not
consistent. During the Mexican-American War, the United States
condemned Mexican guerrillas to death, but justified this in terms of
the atrocities which the guerrillas had allegedly committed. At the
time of the Mexican Civil War, Prince Maximilian was court mar-
tialled and condemned to death for having ordered the execution of
all rebels in 1865 and causing the death of many insurgents. In the
Franco-Prussian war, the Prussians sought to deprive the armed re-
sistance movements of any status as legitimate combatants. The
Prussian commander did not, however, consider it politic to simply
refuse to grant the status of legitimate belligerent to irregular forces
and to act so blatantly in contravention of the customs of war. A
declaration was made concerning French snipers who were required
to produce proof of authorization. Generally speaking, those who had
been captured were unable to do so. Several died as a result. More-
over, Prussian troops terrorized the civilian population suspected of
aiding the snipers. They surrounded the villages, removed the popu-
lation, shot the suspects and burned the villages.
Even at this time, however, the guerrillas still retained rights as
legitimate belligerents. Accordingly, the Red Cross Convention of
1864 made no distinction between belligerents, providing in Article
6, that wounded or sick soldiers should be cared for, irrespective of
nationality. However, towards the end of the nineteenth century,
under the influence of the Great Powers, efforts to limit the rights of
guerrillas increased.
Efforts to codify the laws of war went hand in hand with efforts
to secure the privileged legal status of regular armies. At the Brus-
sels Conference in 1874, the delegates representing the small states
and those representing the Great Powers with powerful land armies
clearly differed on the principles involved. On the one hand, the for-
mer held that recognition of mass uprisings should only be subject to
one condition, observation of the laws and customs of war. On the
other hand, the latter claimed that only regular armies were entitled
to recognition as legitimate belligerents. They claimed that extension
of these rights to the civilian population would lead to anarchy, to a
war by all against all and to barbarism. They believed that the draft
declaration had made the maximum possible concessions in ex-
tending protection of the laws of war to militias, to volunteer corps
meeting the four conditions subsequently listed in Article 1 of the
1907 Hague Convention, and to the population spontaneously taking
50. Id.
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up arms as the enemy approached.
The delegates of the small states found these concessions inade-
quate, and demanded that the entire civilian population in occupied
territories be accorded the rights of belligerents, and not solely at the
time of invasion. The Belgian delegate remarked that the citizens
who took up arms to defend their country and who could be shot on
the spot, could believe, with justification, that their government, in
signing the convention, had signed their death warrants. The dele-
gate from the Netherlands demanded express recognition of the
right to insurrection."1
The subject was again discussed at the first Hague Conference
in 1899 in the context of a draft based on the Brussels Declaration.
The British delegate, Sir John Ardagh, proposed an addition of a
clause to the draft which emphasized that "nothing in this chapter
must be considered as tending to diminish or suppress the right
which belongs to the population of a country to fulfill its duty of
opposing the invaders by all lawful means of the most patriotic resis-
tance."' 52 The Russian delegate, Martens, explained that the goal of
the Conference was not to limit the right of self-defense nor to place
obstacles in the way of patriotism, but to create a legal basis for
participants in combat and to protect the life and property of the
unarmed population.53 The Swiss delegate, Colonel Kunzli, sup-
ported the British proposal and sought improvement in the usages of
war as well as protection of the population engaged in a levee en
masse to defend its soil. In his intervention, Kunzli asked the Con-
ference not to punish patriotism, not to adopt rigorous measures
against the people who rose up en masse to defend their soil. Recal-
ling the glorious independence struggle of the Netherlands, as well
as the uprisings in the course of Swiss history, Kunzli pointed out
that not only men in their prime, but older men as well as women
and children took part in combat. He ended by saying that the Con-
ference might consider this an excess of patriotism, but they were
excesses which rejoiced the heart and which could happen again.
The Swiss Government therefore could not subscribe to a convention
which would submit one part of the population to martial law and to
the councils of war; patriotism was a virtue to be cultivated and not
suppressed.54
The delegates of the other small states declared that they would
not agree to any limits on the national defense. The Belgian dele-
gate, Bernaert, defended the interests of small states, which in the






nature of things could not be invaders, but were exposed to being
invaded. He opposed any imposition which would cast the inhabi-
tants of occupied territories in the role of simple spectators. He as-
serted that the first duty of the citizen was to defend his country.
Belgium owed the first pages of its history to the fulfillment of this
duty. To a country, the right to self-defense was absolute, and was
not only a right, but a duty; even an imperative duty. According to
Bernaert, small countries, especially, needed to be able to complete
their national defense by utilizing all of their resources. It would be
impossible to tell the citizens not to get involved in struggles in
which their country's fate was at stake. The Belgian delegate
claimed that he would have preferred to maintain the situation
which then existed rather than face the perilous uncertainty which
would result from the provisions put forward.55
The German delegate, Colonel Schwarzhoff, adopted a totally
different position. He was firmly opposed to any proposal tending to
recognize a right of popular resistance on the part of occupied terri-
tories, and since one spoke so much about humanity, it was time to
recall that the soldiers too, were men, and had the right to be treated
with humanity. The soldiers, who, worn out by fatigue after long
marches or after combat, came to rest in a village, had to be sure
that the peaceful inhabitants were not suddenly transformed into fe-
rocious enemies. Schwarzhoff was of the opinion that even the provi-
sion in Article 2 was superfluous, considering the fact that Article 1
only subordinated recognition as a belligerent to conditions which
were very easy to meet; yet, he nevertheless voted for this article in a
spirit of conciliation. However, his concessions stopped with those
who urged absolute liberty in the area of national defense."6
The French and Russian delegates undertook efforts to reach a
compromise. Martens emphasized that, even though it was not a
matter of questioning the sacred right of the population to self-de-
fense, in order to reduce the evils and calamities caused by war, it
was necessary that the defense forces be organized and disciplined.
Martens' interpretation was adopted in the proces verbal and in the
Preamble. Finally, the Preamble was adopted with express mention
of Articles 1 and 2 of the regulation.
The travaux preparatoires thus shed some light on the signifi-
cance of the Preamble to the Fourth Hague Convention. There is no
justification for interpreting Articles 1 and 2 of the Hague Regula-
tions so that persons not included in the provision of these articles
are not protected by the law of nations; for in accordance with the
principle contained in the Preamble to the Fourth Hague Conven-
55. Id. at 62.
56. Id.
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tion, they "remain under the protection and the rule of the principles
of the law of nations, as they result from the usages established
among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity and the dictates
of the public conscience. ' ' 6 These usages, such as those emerging
from the practices and doctrines of the seventeenth, eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries, did not discriminate against the guerrillas
among belligerents.
In the twentieth century, resistance movements have proved to
be an important means of conducting warfare. They remain vitally
important in the national defense of many small states. Guerrillas
played an important role in the Boer War, in colonial wars, and in
the First, and, above all, the Second World War in Yugoslavia, Po-
land, the USSR, France, Greece, Indonesia, Cuba, Algeria, and re-
cently in Vietnam, emphasized in practical terms the rebirth of this
kind of warfare.
The scope of guerrilla activity was for the first time expressly
recognized in the Peace Treaty with Italy. In its Preamble, the Con-
tracting Parties took into consideration that after the said Armistice,
the Italian armed forces, those of the government as well as those of
the resistance, had taken an active part in the war against
Germany. 58
2. Between the Hague Regulations and the Geneva Conven-
tions of 1949.-During this period, the atrocities committed against
guerrillas and the population suspected of such behavior reached
dimensions never before known to history. In the course of the Boer
War, English troops burned the farms of proprietors whom they sus-
pected of participating in guerrilla warfare.59 During the First
World War execution of guerrillas and the burning of villages whose
population was suspected of aiding the guerrillas was standard prac-
tice among the German forces. During the Second World War, the
methods of combating guerrilla warfare became even more cruel.
The practice of the German troops was as follows: the guerrillas
were not considered as belligerents but as bandits. This meant that
in the event of capture they were put to death, often after having
been tortured. It was only when the Germans wished to ensure pro-
tection of German soldiers who had fallen into the hands of the guer-
rillas that they recognized the guerrillas as legitimate combatants.
The German authorities justified their practice in the following
terms:
(i) the guerrillas as a movement did not observe the laws
57. Id. at 63-64.




and customs of war and the German authorities were free to
treat each member of the movement as an illegitimate belliger-
ent; and
(ii) the guerrillas were not fighting in the name of the gov-
ernment recognized by Germany.
The appeal by the International Committee of the Red Cross,
on August 17, 1944, addressed the governments of the belligerent
states on the subject of acts of war committed by and against forma-
tions of combatants which the adversary did not recognize as a bel-
ligerent or who were considered guerrillas. The Committee required
that
the fundamental principles of international law and humanity
must be equally applied when in the course of war, situations
arise which are not explicitly mentioned in international conven-
tions and that all combatants, irrespective of whatever authority
they may claim, must in as much as they are in conformity with
laws and customs of war, and especially since they have at their
head a responsible person, and carry a distinct sign or mark and
their arms openly - benefit from the guarantees reserved for
prisoners of war, if they fall into the hands of the adversary. '
According to one writer, Dedijer, 1 "the occupation forces in
conformity with Hitler's decision on the subjugation of Yugoslavia
considered every act of armed resistance against the occupying
forces as an act of rebellion, as a war crime. The members of the
partisan units were not given the status of belligerents and accord-
ingly, the captured or wounded partisans were, usually, executed on
the spot. As a consequence of the growth of the partisan movement
and in order to protect their own soldiers who were captured the
commanders of the occupying units began to change their attitude
towards the members of the partisan movement.""2 There developed
a system of repression in the regions where the partisans operated.
Villages were burned and civilians were killed. A popular tactic was
to seize a number of hostages and shoot them whenever partisans
had either killed or wounded a German soldier. Thus, there revived
in the twentieth century the barbaric old practice of seizing hostages
and killing them, a practice already rigorously criticized by the time
of the Middle Ages and all but abandoned in modern times - the
prohibition against the seizure and killing of hostages being partly
considered the result of Article 50 of the Hague Regulations pro-
scribing all collective punishment directed against the civilian popu-
60. Id. at 64-65, n.2.
61. Dedijer, On Military Conventions 110 (1961) cited in Melanges, supra note 39, at
65.
62. Melanges, supra note 39, at 65, n.I.
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lation because of individual acts - to the point where inclusion of
express prohibition in the Hague Regulations were thought to be su-
perfluous. By the dawn of the century, use of hostages was consid-
ered illegitimate and almost entirely abandoned, so that Oppenheim
was confident enough to declare that the seizure and killing of hos-
tages "has totally disappeared and will hardly be revived."63
Such practices during World War II were not so much the re-
sult of cruelty and arbitrariness on the part of individual com-
manders as the result of orders given by the German High Com-
mand. Thus, the ordinance by Marshal Keitel on July 23, 1941
declared that, considering the size of the occupied territories in the
East, the armed forces deployed to secure this area would only be
sufficient if all resistance was punished, not so much with a view to
bringing the guilty to justice, but with a view to creating such terror
by the armed forces that it would be possible to extinguish from
among the population any will to resist. The commanders were to
find the means to maintain order by using draconian measures."4 In
this spirit, Keitel's ordinance of September 16, 1941 (NOKW-258,
Pros. Ex 53) provided inter alia that 100 prisoners should be shot as
a reprisal for each German soldier killed and fifty killed for each
German soldier wounded. In the words of one expert, "after 1914
a new retrogressive movement set in which reached its present
climax in the terrible conduct of the Second World War, threatening
a new advance to barbarism. We have arrived where we started in
the sixteenth century, at the threat of a total, lawless war." 5
In terms of the legal status of guerrillas, international law
lacked unanimity at the turn of the century. Oppenheim thus re-
marked that "guerrilla war is not real war . . . in strict law the
victor need no longer treat the guerrilla bands as a belligerent power
and their captured members as soldiers," but he continued, "it is
however, advisable that he should do so, so long as they are under
responsible commanders and observe the laws and usages of war."66
The literature of international law touching guerrilla warfare was
remarkable for the diversity of views expressed. Some believed that
although refusal to accord the guerrilla rights as belligerents violated
the general principles and the customs of war, this refusal often re-
sulted from the exigencies of war.6" Others held that the guerrilla
63. I. OPPENHEIM. 2 INTERNATIONAL LAW 271 (1906). The experience of the First
World War led to a revised 4 INTERNATIONAL LAW 420 (ed. II reading instead ... a matter
urgently demanding regulation." Melanges at 65, n.4.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 66, n.2.
66. Id. at 66, n.3.
67. Id. at 66, n.4.
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was useless in modern warfare.68 Still again, others, more optimistic,
expressed the view that the factual situation led automatically to the
application of the laws of war to the guerrillas if the insurrection had
reached considerable dimensions; each party, if it desired to trans-
form hostilities into legitimate war created "suo vigore a condition
in which the rules of warfare become operative."69
In interpreting Articles 1 and 2 of the Hague Regulations some,
however, would have applied the rule of interpretation that that
which was not expressly prohibited was permitted. The classes of
persons not included in the provision of the above Articles, not being
legitimate belligerents, were, therefore, not protected by the law.
Any existing obligations were strictly moral and not legal. This in-
terpretation ignored the Martens clause which had placed the inhab-
itants "under the protection and the rule of the principles of the law
of nations, as they result from the usages established among civilized
peoples." It also ignored the fact that in 1899 the Martens clause
was the price paid to obtain the consent of the small states partici-
pant in the Hague Conference to Articles 1 and 2.
This narrower interpretation influenced sitting tribunals. In the
Hostages Case (Wilhelm List and other German soldiers), the
United States military tribunal sitting at Nuremberg stated that cer-
tain units of partisans in Yugoslavia and Greece, though designated
in a manner corresponding to a military organization and subordi-
nated to a centralized military command structure, "had no common
uniforms" and "generally wore civilian clothes, although parts of
German, Italian, and Serbian uniforms were used to the extent they
could be obtained." The tribunal further stated that "the Soviet star
was generally worn as an insignia," but "(t)he evidence (could) not
sustain a finding that it was such that it could be seen at a distance.
Neither did they carry their weapons openly except when it was to
their advantage to do so." On the basis of these findings, the Tribu-
nal concluded that captured members of these unlawful groups were
not entitled to be treated as prisoners of war. It was, therefore, im-
possible to charge the accused with having killed "such members of
the resistance forces; they being franc-tireurs."70
3. After 1949.-The Geneva Conventions of 1949 ostensibly
helped the legal situation of guerrillas and resistance movements. As
such, members of organized resistance movements were sometimes
68. Id. See also, GRAEBER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW OF BELLIGERENT OCCUPA-
TION, 1863-1914, 87-88 (1949).
69. H. LAUTERPACHT, RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 245 (1947).
70. Official transcript of the American Military Tribunal in the matter of the USA
against Wilhelm List et al. defendants, sitting at Nuremberg, Germany on February 19, 1948.
See L. FRIEDMAN, THE LAW OF WAR: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1303 (1972).
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assimilated with volunteer units provided that they fulfilled the con-
ditions of Article 1 of the Hague Regulation (Article 4 of the Third
Convention). These conditions required that the Contracting Parties
renounce all measures to cause physical suffering or extermination of
the population of the occupied territories (Article 32 of the 4th Con-
vention), that the seizure of hostages as well as collective punish-
ment be expressly forbidden (Articles 33 and 34), and that the pro-
visions of the convention had considerably limited the number of
cases in which capital punishment could be imposed by tribunals
(Articles 64-70). These certainly constituted an improvement in the
legal status of the population suspected of aiding the guerrillas,
which until then, was often subjected to atrocities by the occupying
power.
Nevertheless, the legal status of guerrillas and armed resistance
movements after 1949 still remained unsatisfactory. Its defects and
inadequacies became more evident as a result of the interpretations
given after 1949 to the individual provisions as well as political and
military developments in the post-war years. Accordingly to Baxter,
the 1949 Conventions "instead of clarifying the status of these indi-
viduals, (spies, guerrillas and saboteurs), destroyed what little cer-
tainty existed in the law . . . the Conventions are at their weakest in
delineating the various categories of persons who benefit from the
protection of each."'"
Doctrinally, the argument that whatever was not expressly pro-
hibited was permitted, continued to prevail, with the result being
that the fate of guerrillas and members of resistance movements was
often left to the arbitrariness of the occupying power when the for-
mer fell into their hands. Opinion here remained virtually the same
as before the conclusion of the Geneva Conventions. Legal protection
was reserved to persons who met the conditions envisaged in Article
1 of the Regulations, or at best they were to be treated in accor-
dance with principles of humanity. C.G. Fenwick, in describing the
Warsaw uprising of 1944, observed that "the status of the forces of
resistance would have been difficult to determine even if the invader
had had concern for the legality of his acts" and "the irony of the
'laws of war' " was illustrated here as in other phases of the war
where the judgment of individual commanders determined what was
lawful and unlawful.
72
Practice during the Second World War and during the wars of
national liberation in Africa and Asia in the post war years demon-
strated the vitality of resistance and guerrilla movements. The resur-
71. Baxter So-called Unprivileged Belligerency, "Spies. Guerrillas and Saboteurs,"
BYIL 327 (1951).
72. C. FENWICK, INTERNATIONAL LAW 556 (1952).
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gence and vitality of these proved that guerrilla warfare was not an
anachronism. 3 By the middle of the twentieth century, war had be-
come more and more mobile, extending the theater of war and con-
siderably increasing the prospect of guerrilla warfare. This was
largely the result of developments such as the emergence of highly
efficient super-powers and state police in the face of which most indi-
viduals and groups appeared vulnerable. Developments in technol-
ogy, aviation and the mobility of regular armies also made it possible
for these groups to concentrate enormous firepower against fortified
targets.
These military factors led to the emergence of similarities be-
tween regular armies and guerrilla forces, such as the use of small
airborne units and special forces. Even the clandestine nature of
guerrilla warfare for which the guerrillas had been reproached found
a ready parallel in the camouflage of modern armies. Logically, it
became more and more difficult to deny the character of legitimate
belligerent to the guerrillas, and maintain at the same time that the
small units of the regular army who acted in a similar fashion were
entitled to a privileged legal status.
The military importance of guerrilla warfare today is generally
recognized. It has been described as "the effective weapon of the
weaker adversary," as dangerous for the Great Powers as for small
states, "an extremely cheap weapon, at least - monetarily."74 Ac-
cording to Baxter:
resistance activities were an important instrument in the defeat
of the Axis during the Second World War and it is hardly possi-
ble to name an armed conflict which has taken place since the
conclusion of those hostilities in which guerrillas have not played
an important and often a decisive role. Only rigid legal formal-
ism could lead to characterization of the resistance conducted
against Germany, Italy and Japan as a violation of International
Law. Patriotism, nationalism, allegiance to some sort of political
authority have replaced the desire for loot, which has tradition-
ally been attributed to the guerrilla, in motivating civilians to
take part in warfare, and sabotage by private persons may be
expected to continue on a widespread basis in future warfare as
they have in the past."
Perhaps public international law offered for a time the most ob-
stinate resistance to recognizing the military importance of guerrilla
activities, thereby, justifying discrimination against this form of war-
fare. It was, however, illusory to hold that discriminatory legal provi-
73. Cf. supra note 71.
74. H. KISSINGER, PROBLEMS OF NATIONAL STRATEGY 334 (1965).
75. Baxter, supra note 71, at 344.
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sions could discourage an oppressed population in any occupied terri-
tory from participating in a resistance struggle waged by guerrillas,
so long as they were determined to take part in that struggle. The
political and military factors which determined the forms of resis-
tance and the scope of individuals participating in hostilities were far
too powerful to be stymied by a legal norm discouraging the popula-
tion from participating in a resistance movement. In 1955, for in-
stance, the British authorities in Kenya executed 219 natives for
Mau Mau murders and 508 for other terrorist offenses. 6 Yet, in
spite of these and other "successful" military operations, by 1960,
Kenya was on the road to independence. International law, refur-
bished and reinvigorated by the newer forces at work in the interna-
tional arena, (newly independent Third World states, internationally
recognized national liberation movements such as the PLO,
SWAPO, and ANC) today, arguably, has a duty to preserve
whatever legal constraints exist to thwart what, in effect, often
amounts to military aggression.
On one hand, guerrilla movements have generally shown
scrupulous adherence to the laws of war so as to demonstrate the
military character of their organization. On the other hand, much
guerrilla warfare is of an inhuman character. The situation is partly
the result of a vicious circle. While the party opposing the guerrillas
often justified its own atrocities with reference to the atrocities per-
petrated by guerrillas who were denied the status of legitimate bel-
ligerents, the guerrillas considered laws of war, which imposed obli-
gations on only one of the parties, manifestly unjust.
In the past, regulations which distinguished between belligerents
whose position was deemed to be established under the law and those
who "remained under the safeguard of the principles of the law of
nations, such as resulted from the usages established between civi-
lized nations,' 77 helped to aggravate the vicious circle and make
wars more and more bloody, regardless of whether the atrocities
were committed against "criminals" and non-legitimate belligerents,
or whether they were committed as reprisals. This situation, com-
monplace during the Cuban uprising against the Spaniards during
the last century, and in much of this century, have to some extent
been modified by more recent legal development.
Detailed examination of the 1977 Geneva Protocol 178 necessa-
rily falls outside the scope of this article. It is worth noting, however,
that Article 1(4) extends the 1949 Geneva Convention to include
76. See Britannia Book of the Year 203 , 756 (1956).
77. Melanges, supra note 39, at 73.
78. International Committee of the Red Cross, Protocols Additional to the Geneva Con-
ventions of 12 August 1949, 3-73 (1979).
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"armed conflicts in which people .are fighting against colonial domi-
nation and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exer-
cise of their right to self-determination, as enshrined in the Charter
• ..and the Declaration on Friendly Relations."79 Article 96(3) also
allows the representative of a people engaged in such an armed
struggle against a state party to the Protocol to undertake to apply
the 1949 Convention and Protocol 1 by way of unilateral declara-
tion.80 In addition, Article 44 of Protocol 1 attempted to afford legal
recognition to certain types of guerrilla activity by modifying the re-
quirements of wearing distinctive emblems and carrying arms
openly.8' In this way, it further extended the category of "lawful
belligerent." It is, therefore, possible that some activities described
as "terrorist" are probably now protected.by the 1949 Convention
and Protocol 1.
On the other hand, Protocol 1 also provides that "mercenaries"
shall not have the right to be considered as lawful combatants or
prisoners of war, although a capturing state may choose to accord
such status to captured mercenaries who, in any case, remain under
the protection of the fundamental guarantees, applicable to all per-
sons, as set forth in Article 75 of Protocol 1.82 It is plausible to
maintain that acts of terrorism by mercenaries, as defined under
Protocol 1, are, notwithstanding "fundamental guarantees," not le-
gally protected acts, even if colored by political motivation.
D. Terrorism and Contemporary Practice
Typically, a typology of terrorist actors on the international
stage would include:
(i) Those groups motivated by nationalism, and fighting to
achieve national self-determination, e.g., the Basques (ETA), the
Catalans, the PLO (Black September, Abu Nidal et al), the IRA
(the Provos), the Corsican, Moluccan, Tamil and Karen separatists.
Notably, both separatist groups and groups fighting to overthrow co-
lonial rule are motivated by political and cultural nationalism and
ultimately seek to achieve national self-determination. Therefore,
they can form part of a single category.
(ii) Those motivated by other ideology such as anarchism, com-
munism and so on, for example, the Japanese Red Army, the Red
Brigades, and Baader Meinhof.
(iii) Those motivated by religion, e.g., the Moslem Brotherhood
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as in the case of Iran.
(iv) Radical regimes such as Syria, Iran, Iraq and Libya."3
(v) Secular regimes, such as Chile and Argentina under junta
governments, and inherently terroristic and genocidal regimes such
as the deposed Pol Pot regime of Kampuchea.
At the political level, a policy of terrorism seems to offer a num-
ber of possible tactical advantages:
i) it achieves greater publicity for the particular cause; 4
ii) it demonstrates the vulnerability of the existing government
and the ineptness of its security forces;
iii) it can trigger widespread repression by the government's
armed forces, resulting in alienation of the population and dimin-
83. Some of these theocratic regimes are reminiscent of times past. Today's slaughter of
the Bahais by the Iranian regime is probably no different from earlier expressions of religious
persecution, e.g., the thirteenth century extermination of the Albigenses through the influence
of Pope Innocent IIl and the Inquisition. It has been argued that in Islam, the seven Hudud
(severe) crimes are adultery, defamation, alcoholism, theft, brigandage, apostasy, and rebel-
lion/corruption of Islam. While prosecution and punishment for these crimes is mandatory
under the Koran, prosecution for international terrorism or murder is not. Note, Insuring
Against Abuse of Diplomatic Immunity, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1517 (1986). The logic of this
approach could be to have devout Moslems acquiesce in or even ultimately to sponsor the
perpetration of terrorist acts.
84. Murphy, Recent International Developments in Controlling Terrorism, 4 CHINESE
Y.B. INT'L L. AND AFFAIRS 98-99 (1984) states that:
Since the primary goal of terrorists is publicity, and their actions are
designed to reach this goal, the general public is much more conscious of terror-
ist activities than of other less spectacular crimes. Local media report major
terrorist incidents throughout the world, and this serves to increase public anxi-
ety, even in those countries which are free from terrorist attack.
This statement reflects Murphy's basic ignorance of terrorist's goal's. His is at best intuitive
surrealism. For if "the primary goal of terrorists" were publicity, this would be better served
by a policy emphasizing (i) infiltration - "entryism" - of media institutions, aiming at their
ultimate control, (ii) the establishment of independent news organs with the financial backing
of so-called "terrorist" state sympathizers, e.g., oil rich Libya, Iraq and Iran; (iii) systematic
analysis, explanation and propagation of the causes which generate terrorist activity; arguably,
the latter would provide the prior conditioning and the psychological climate necessary for a
less jaundiced approach when the occasional outrage is perpetrated.
Others write in a similar vein:
[T]he absence of any well-defined long-term political or military aims that
characterizes the Tupamaros is shared by many a Latin American terrorist
group, as well as by such groups as the German Baader Meinhof Gang and the
Italian Brigatte Rosse, which have as their main goal the disruption of society
rather than the defeat of the established government's military. All such groups
operate only in the immediate present - today is far more important, signifi-
cant, and symbolic than tomorrow.
Radu, Terrorism and Insurgency in Latin America, 28 ORBiS 29 (1984). According to this
view, the sole concern of terrorists is the immediate bestseller, to "make it" on a rather gro-
tesque and macabre hit parade. But contrary to Murphy and Radu, terrorism is not simply
contemporary art for art's sake. Rather, the primary goal of many so-called terrorist groups
has had to do with self-determination, national independence and sovereignty. This is
cathechistic as far as concerns contemporary terrorism. The search for publicity is in these
instances only incidental. Murphy confuses shadow with substance; Radu either ignores or is
unaware of a substantial body of literature detailing the objectives of terrorists ("terrorist"
manifestoes being nomore vague than those of parties in government or opposition). Like war,
in Clausewitz's celebrated dictum, terrorism being essentially a continuation of political inter-
course with the addition of other means. K. CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 605 (1970).
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ished support for the government, thereby facilitating its eventual
overthrow; and
iv) it can feed and maintain a myth of the fearless warrior,
thereby, inspiring further resistance; e.g., the Afghans against the
British and the Soviets and the Vietnamese successively against the
French, the United States and more recently China.
On the other hand, a policy of terrorism confronts three major
risks:
(i) Terrorists invariably run the risk of being caught out and
destroyed. How great is such a risk? How does one measure it?
These are empirical questions for the practitioner and his opponent.
(ii) Terrorists, by the very nature of their deeds, always run the
risk of losing popular support. Such support is indispensable if ter-
rorism is to help one succeed in achieving one's ultimate objectives,
such as self-determination, and the transformation of society. The
terrorist is in danger of striking at a civilian target, yet expecting
civilian support. To engage in terrorism in this scenario is to squan-
der scarce political capital. It can easily stimulate a maelstrom of
enmity and hostility when either deliberately or mistakenly directed
against civilian targets. IRA bombings of pubs in Britain, the annual
Christmas bombings against department stores and restaurants, the
assassination of revered figures such as the elderly Lord Mountbat-
ten only serve to alienate the target population. There is no evidence
that through the use of these methods terrorists have ever caused
governments to withdraw. Indeed, British forces still remain in
Northern Ireland. Neither Basques nor Catalans have achieved au-
tonomy. Other powerful forces, such as the Catholic Church, have
expressed their revulsion at the methods chosen by terrorists. Terror-
ist measures, at most, call into question the credibility of govern-
ment. The government must act to save face and responds
accordingly.
(iii) The terrorist by inaction runs the risk of betraying his
weakness, indecisiveness, lack of leadership, even a paralysis of the
will to act with the attendant demoralization of his followers, not
unlike Pablo, the guerrilla leader in Hemingway's For Whom the
Bell Tolls.
Terrorist methods can encompass mock executions, Russian rou-
lette, threats to relatives, solitary confinement, isolation, and sensory
deprivations leading to disorientation (e.g., because of subjection to
constant harsh lighting, sleep deprivation, etc). These psychological
ploys are sometimes combined with more robust physical treatment.
Torture, in its various forms, is used to buttress psychological war-
fare waged against the individual. In Chile, under the Pinochet re-
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gime, psychiatrists working with victims of the dictatorship discov-
ered that the repression in Chile was expressly designed to cause
psychological damage to vast sectors of the population. The psychia-
trists found that the complaints more frequently repeated by the
thousands of patients they saw were for depression, anxiety, insom-
nia, nightmares, diminution of intellectual powers, impotence, distor-
tions in family and other emotional relationships, loss of memory,
frigidity, and apathy.
As a general proposition, we can conclude that all activities
which cause such effects violate individual human rights and are
prima facie evidence of the use of terror. Terrorism, it would seem,
is a function of political commitment and lack of feasible alterna-
tives (the negotiating process has failed and democracy is unavail-
ing). In psychological terms, it can mark the transformation from
impotence on the part of the oppressed or the colonized to self-re-
spect and independence. 5 On the other hand, the destabilization of
Jamaica and of Chile provide vivid examples of what has been some-
times labelled "psycho-terror," and can signal the creation of a cli-
mate of political turmoil which can ultimately cause a drain on nec-
essary foreign investments. At best, terrorism is seemingly the fruit
of political alienation and subjugation. However, by themselves, the
results of terrorism - the death of innocents and ensuing despair -
are fruits which wither on the vine. By themselves, the ideals of ter-
rorists rarely come to fruition.8 Almost invariably they come to
naught. Terrorism is, therefore, more often than not an exercise in
futility. It is at best faute de mieux, the continuation of war by other
means. Even if in the short term it can secure cheap publicity (this,
however, is all too easily offset by the cost of alienation), the loss of
support can be prohibitive for a movement already lacking wide-
spread support.
In economic terms, the effect of terrorism is often to disrupt the
government's development plans (e.g., the activities of a Savimbi in
Angola, and a RENAMO in Mozambique). In such circumstances,
the government will intensify its anti-terrorist responses, the guerril-
las will fortify their defenses, and the expatriate business manager
85. See F. FANON, THE WRETCHED OF THE EARTH 73 (1966). See also, BLACK SKIN
WHITE MASKS (C. Markmann trans. 1967), and A DYING COLONIALISM, (H. Chevalier trans.
1967).
86. As one observer remarks with respect to Baader Meinhof "the group accomplished
almost nothing with its bombs, sub-machine guns and raids during 1970-72. But the leaders'
beliefs, imprisonment, trial and above all their deaths, have had a lasting influence on the
German left." Livingston, Violence is the only way, N.Y. Times Book Rev., Jan. 3, 1989; S.
AUST, THE BAADER MEINHOLF GROUP: THE INSIDE STORY OF A PHENOMENON (trans. A. Boll
1987). On the other bhand, to take another example, since 1968, more than 2,600 people have
died in political violence in Northern Ireland. In 1987, ninety-three people were killed, with
the I.R.A. claiming responsibility for sixty of the deaths. N.Y. Times, January 7, 1988 A.6.
[Vol. 8:2
Winter 1990]
will beef up his personal security with the aim of thwarting kidnap-
ping, extortion and even assassination. Private industry will continue
to spend billions of dollars annually to defend against terrorism,
costs which are passed onto the consumer. In short, the only result is
diminution of services. These anti-terrorist measures, while effective
in the short term, too often fail to take into account the basic objec-
tive conditions which give rise to terrorism in the first place, and can
be ultimately only partially successful.
Perhaps, detailed application of risk analysis in the study of ter-
rorism and the responses to it, might yield some useful results. So far
this has not been done; but such a study classifying the risks involved
according to degree (high risks, medium risks, low risks, minimum
risks, etc. - discounting other factors, and relating the foregoing to
the nature and type of political activity), might help with under-
standing the problem.
8 7
1. Terrorism and National Self-Determination.-In his article
entitled "The Legalization of Terror," 88 L.C. Green criticized the
principle of self-determination as the possible source of acts of ter-
rorism. Green's arguments against self-determination appear inade-
quate for a number of reasons. First, his study was unnecessarily
limited to United Nations practice in respect to self-determination,
thus, ignoring much of the relevant state practice. Second, it is not
clear why the principle of self-determination should be ineligible for
what Green termed "canonization." On the contrary, it is today al-
most universally accepted that the principle of self-determination has
the status of jus cogens, a peremptory norm of international law.
Arguably, it is difficult to see why state sovereignty should still re-
tain this status of "canonization" despite manifest erosion of respect
for the principle. Third, the overall result of Green's approach would
be, consciously or unconsciously, to strip colonized peoples of any
defense against aggression. Green's most striking failure was to dis-
tinguish between "attack" and "defense." His reference to "diplo-
matic double talk" sheds little or no light on the subject.89
Terrorism is arguably justified where the colonial, occupying, or
foreign power persistently engages in acts of repression in flagrant
violation of the rights of native inhabitants. In short, terrorism may
well be legitimate in the pursuit of national self-determination, for
terrorism in these circumstances amounts to no more than a response
to every day aggression and an act of self-defense or reprisal; the
former sanctioned under international law, the latter sanctioned by
87. Ferracuti, supra note 29, at 231-33.
88. ALEXANDER, CARLTON & WILKINSON, TERRORISM: THEORY AND PRACTICE, 175
(1979).
89. Id. at 187.
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state practice. As such, the PAIGC, FRELIMO, MPLA and the
rest were, arguably, legitimately entitled to avail themselves to "ter-
rorism" in seeking to repel the terror routinely visited upon them by
the Portugese colonialists. So too, the ANC described by Reagan as
"terrorist," is entitled to resort to terrorism when resisting unlawful
violence by the South African authorities. In fact, what these forces
engage in is really counter-terrorism. 90 And, we engage in a misno-
mer when we label it "terrorism" per se. Given the premium the
international community attaches to the right of self-determination,
the fact that self-determination is a legal principle,9 thrusts us into
a situation of self help in the enforcement of legal rights, and at-
tempts to prevent further violation of international law.
Moreover, it might well be objected that in this instance, given
the history of United States collaboration with the criminal
apartheid South African regime - a fact repeatedly denounced in
the General Assembly's resolutions - the United States Govern-
ment may well lack the moral authority necessary to censor actions
undertaken by the ANC, the PAC, and others to achieve the right to
self-determination. Condemnation of ANC "terrorism" per se, could
thus be dismissed as hypocritical and self-serving.
It is sometimes urged that terrorists originally had good motives
and sound objectives. This is no longer the case. What does one
make of such nostalgia? Does the argument withstand scrutiny? Ir-
respective of good intentions, is the terrorist entitled to act as judge,
jury and executioner? What permits him in a society allegedly ad-
herent to the "rule of law" and to "due process" to assume one mo-
ment the judge's robes, then the next, to set them aside to seize the
executioner's axe or the hangman's noose? On the face of it, nothing
legitimates such behavior. However, what if contrary to our prevail-
90. The term "counterterrorism" in State Department usage is largely functional. It is
synonymous with intelligence gathering to thwart terrorist activity. Such usage, however, arbi-
trarily omits equally significant political, military and even economic responses aimed at coun-
tering terrorism. To define "counterterrorism" in such terms is therefore inadequate. This sort
of activity could more accurately be described as "political surveillance" or "surveillance of
political and paramilitary groups," even "counterintelligence." The latter includes information
gathered to protect against espionage or other form of clandestine intelligence activity, sabo-
tage, or assassinations, even when conducted on behalf of foreign powers, organizations, or
persons, and international terrorism. DOD Procedures, app. A, sec. 5; also Exec. Order No.
12,333, at sec. 3.4(a).
Such intelligence is generally used for (1) prevention, e.g., in 1983, the FBI used such
information to intercept pro-Khomeni students who planned to bomb a theatre filled with stu-
dents sympathetic to the Shah; (2) prosecution of terrorists, e.g., Fawaz Yunis. Arguably, this
reflects the supremacy of the rule of law and recognition of the criminality of terrorism; (3)
crisis management, e.g., the hostages detained in Beirut. Timely and accurate information will
often determine success in combatting physical acts of terrorism.
91. 1. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 575-77 (1973); also
Cristescu, The Right.to Self-Determination: Historical and Current Development as the bases
of United Nations Instruments, United Nations, New York (1981), E/CN.4/Sub.2/404/Rev.
I, paras. 207-208 at 29-30.
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ing assumptions, it is questionable whether these societies are in fact
genuinely and substantively adhering to the rule of law and due pro-
cess, and the quality of justice is somewhat strained? Is he then, in
the absence of protection by the law, entitled to resort to self-help in
violation of existing law? Examples which spring to mind include the
Jews in the ghettoes of Central and Eastern Europe, Yugoslav and
other partisans, and even Arabs on the West Bank. Experience
seems to counsel that so long as the objective conditions of injustice
persist, the search for justice invariably continues. People will often
employ whatever means are thought necessary to remedy the injus-
tices they suffer. Justice done, terrorism, which appeared initially as
a quixotic undertaking by the incurably romantic, becomes at best
ersatz, irrelevant, totally lacking in intellectual and moral justifica-
tion, and more important, popular support.
As Weisel suggests:
We find many examples in the tales told about all revolu-
tionary movements, in the histories of every struggle for national
independence. Heroes and martyrs became the pride of their
people by fighting with a weapon in their hand or a prayer on
their lips. In a thousand different ways, each proclaimed that
freedom alone gives meaning to life of an individual or a people
- for a people - that is, for a social, ethnic or religious group
- the problem and its solution are both simple. When a people
loses its freedom, it had a right, a duty to employ every possible
means to win it back. The same is true of the individual - with
one difference: An individual's resistance can be expressed in
more than one way." '
2. Terrorism and Self-Defense a. Municipal law.-The mu-
nicipal law of self-defense generally permits the use of such force as
appears reasonably necessary to defend against the threat of unlaw-
ful and immediate violence. For a claim of self-defense to succeed,
the proponent must establish four elements:
(i) A reasonable belief that the force used was necessary for
his protection, i.e., a belief which a reasonable person in similar
circumstances would have formed. Under the traditional com-
mon law view, while an honest and reasonable belief sufficed,
the defense was still available even if it turned out that the be-
lief was wrong and there was, in fact, no actual need to use
force in self-defense. 93
(ii) A reasonable belief that the threatened harm was immi-
nent, i.e., that it would be inflicted immediately if the party
92. Weisel, Whai Really Makes us Free, N.Y. Daily News, December 27, 1987.
93. Shorter v. People, 2 N.Y. 193 (1849).
TERRORISM
DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
claiming self-defense did not act in self-defense. This also re-
quired consideration of whether the alleged aggressor appeared
willing and able to injure the defendant. 9'
(iii) The threatened harm was unlawful. This raised the
question of whether the initial aggressor in an affray could claim
the defense at all.
(iv) That the force which the defendant used was reasona-
ble, i.e., proportionate or no more than appeared necessary
under the circumstances to protect against the threatened
harm.9"
A prohibition against the use of "deadly force," i.e., force used
with intent to cause death or serious bodily injury or known by its
user to create a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury -
limited the right to self-defense. [Model Penal Code 3.11(2).] This
prohibition is not absolute, however. Courts often followed the prece-
dent established in Beard v. United States96 that deadly force should
only be used if one reasonably believed that he was about to be sub-
jected by another person to possible death or great bodily injury, and
that deadly force was necessary to prevent the harm.
In a related vein, many jurisdictions following Brown v. United
States97 no longer require the defendant to retreat before using
deadly force. However, several states still adhere to the common law
rule, holding the defendant to a duty to retreat before using deadly
force. The Model Penal Code similarly requires the defendant to re-
treat, surrender possession of that which is demanded by another as-
serting a claim of right to it, or comply with a demand to abstain
from any action he or she has no duty to take, if this could be done
with complete safety. [Model Penal Code 3.04(2)(b)(ii).]
Generally, the initial aggressor in an altercation forfeits his
right to assert self-defense. Rowe v. United States.98 The rationale is
that the victim, in defending himself against the aggressor, is ordina-
rily using lawful force, and the defendant can only use self-defense
in response to threats of unlawful harm. However, there are situa-
tions in which the initial aggressor may regain the right to claim to
have acted in self-defense. If the victim responds to the aggressor's
use of nondeadly force with deadly force, the aggressor can use
whatever force appears reasonably necessary, including deadly force
to repel the attack. The rationale here is that since the law does not
allow nondeadly force to be met with deadly force, the victim has
threatened unlawful harm. The aggressor may also regain his right
94. People v. Williams, 205 N.E.2d 749 (Il1. 1965).
95. Model Penal Code 3.04.
96. 158 U.S. 550 (1895).
97. 256 U.S. 335 (1921).
98. 164 U.S. 546 (1896).
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to claim to have acted in self-defense by withdrawing from the alter-
cation. Ordinarily, the defendant must actually notify his adversary
of the desire to desist, but following Rowe v. United States99 some
jurisdictions hold that even an unsuccessful effort to do so, if reason-
able, will suffice.
It is intriguing to imagine the consequences of applying these
principles to many contemporary domestic conflicts. These conflicts
are regulated by domestic law, but it is submitted that these situa-
tions are often not entirely unambiguous, and neutral and rigorous
application of the foregoing principles might conceivably have un-
foreseen results. Imagine a hypothetical Haitian peasant who, for the
first time, seeks to exercise the right to vote, sees his compatriots
similarly seeking to vote being shot down by the TonTon Macoutes
in cold blood. The peasant fears for his life and for the lives of others
not yet killed. His claim to act in self-defense, or in defense of the
others seems a colorable one. This hypothetical is easily extended to
El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and other situations similarly
blighted by death squads or dictatorship.
b. International law.-After the First and Second World
Wars, public international law increased its efforts to outlaw the use
of force. An exception is still made for self-defense, although its ex-
tent remains controversial. In contrast with the situation under mu-
nicipal law, there is little agreement at the international level as to
the circumstances in which the right of self-defense may be exer-
cised. Article 51 of the United Nations Charter provides the legal
basis for NATO, the Warsaw Pact and sirmilar alliances. Literally,
the words "if an armed attack occurs" in Article 51, would require
that an armed attack must have occurred before force can be used in
self-defense. Under this view, there is no right of anticipatory self-
defense against an imminent attack.
On the other hand, a state can conceivably be the object of an
attack before the attack actually occurs. The French text uses the
words "dans le cas ou un membre . ..est l'objet d'une agression
armee."10 ° Such a member state would, on the latter reading, be en-
titled to act in self-defense. Advocates of a right of anticipatory self-
defense further claim that Article 51 does not limit the circum-
stances in which self-defense may be exercised.
Israel's actions against the PLO, its incursions into the Lebanon
as well as the bombing of the Iraqi nuclear reactor, United States
actions against Libya, South African raids into Angola probably fall
99. Id.
100. "In the case where a member ... is the object of an armed attack." (author's
translations).
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under the rubric of anticipatory self-defense. These governments re-
ject the argument that the word "if," as used in Article 51 means
"if" literally. The sovereign state is -considered entitled to use force
in defense of a range of interests even when there is neither an ac-
tual armed attack nor imminent danger of one. However, United
Nations General Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX), offers a broad
definition of the term "aggression," and declares that "no considera-
tion of whatever nature, whether political, economic, military or oth-
erwise, may serve as a justification for aggression."' 1
As one observer remarks:
the question whether an attack is imminent is inevitably a ques-
tion of opinion and degree, and any rule founded on such a crite-
rion is bound to be subjective and capable of abuse. To confine
self-defense to cases where an armed attack has actually oc-
curred, on the other hand, has the merit of precision; the occur-
rence of an armed attack is a question of fact which is usually
capable of objective verification.1"'
It has also been argued that attacks on a state's nationals resident
abroad do not entitle the state to use force in order to defend its
nationals. 10 3 Nor does self-defense include the right of armed repri-
sals. If terrorists enter one state from another, the first state may use
force to arrest or expel the terrorists, but having done so, it is not
entitled to retaliate by attacking the other state. The Security Coun-
cil has, thus, frequently condemned Israel for carrying out armed
reprisals against her neighbors. Finally, force used in self-defense
must be proportional to that of the armed attack. Failing this, minor
incidents could be the pretext for starting total war.
In terms of scope, Article 51 speaks of "individual or collective
101. 12 I.L.M. 11710 (1974); 13 I.L.M. 588 (1975).
102. Article 51 provides:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual
or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a member of the
United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to
maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by members in the
exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Secur-
ity Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the
Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it
deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.
See M. AKEHURST, MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 245-47 (5th ed.
1984).for criticism of the arguments relating to anticipatory self-defence as relates to Article
51 [hereinafter M. AKEHURST]
103. 1. BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 289-301
(1963). See also Sofaer supra note 39 at 921:
These communications, following Qaddafi's long history of support for ter-
rorism, and his threats against U.S. citizens, established overwhelmingly that
Libya was responsible for the attack. In addition, the President was faced with
strong evidence of some 30 possible impending Libyan attacks on U.S. facilities
and personnel throughout the world. The April 14 strikes were to deter these
and other planned attacks. Id.
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self-defence." According to one view, a right of collective self-de-
fense is merely a combination of individual rights of self-defense.
States may exercise collectively a right which any of them might
have exercised individually. It is puzzling to see why, if the argu-
ment holds for states, the same should not apply to individuals or
groups. As a corollary, "terrorists" or guerrillas fighting against an
occupying power may legally defend since each could have legally
exercised a right of individual self-defense in the same
circumstances.
A claim of self-defense by so-called "terrorists" can nevertheless
pose a number of problems. In a "colonial situation,"104 for instance,
the colonized, the party urging self-defense will often claim to have
been subjected to a long history of abuse, "une aggression de tous les
jours," 05 if you will. This provides the basis for a defense against
accusations of having engaged in "terrorist" acts. In such situations,
however, the "terrorists" may have attacked their victims after a
particular period or episode of abuse has ended, or they may have
acted despite the fact that there was no prospect of immediate physi-
cal harm. Self-defense strictly speaking may therefore not apply. In
contrast, they may even have had the option of leaving rather than
attacking the victim (a rare event in the colonial situation), thus,
rendering the use of force unreasonable.
The reasonableness of this defense must, therefore, be evaluated
from the standpoint of the oppressed people, their specific exper-
iences, their psychology, and the disadvantaged position that they
have occupied. In light of these factors, "terrorism" may not be an
unreasonable response to a history of abuse. To draw an unhappy
parallel between the conduct of a "terrorist" in a colonial situation,"
and that of a battered spouse in the domestic setting is not to engage
in mere emotional rhetoric, but to focus on the inequities of situa-
tions which are probably not intrinsically different in qualitative
terms.
II. The Response to Terror: The Inadequacy of the Framework
A. National Responses
Terrorism is in theory and practice a two-edged sword, as it is
in the propaganda war between the superpowers. Yonah Alexander,
in arguing that terrorism is likely to increase both at home and
abroad, adduced among others the following reasons:
(1) International connections amongst states, especially be-
tween the Soviet Union and the Third World greatly facilitate
104. See M. AKEHURST, supra note 102, at 148-49.
105. Every day aggression (author's translation).
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terrorist activities.
(2) Terrorist groups are continually able to exploit condi-
tions of social unrest, including East-West issues, such as de-
ployment of Euromissiles.
(3) Ninety percent of terrorist groups in the world are
Marxist and pro-Marxists sympathies (which the Soviet Union
and is surrogates support) have increasingly grown the world
over.'
06
On the other hand, S. Losev, a Soviet writer, points out that:
the agression against Grenada has clearly shown the true worth
of the expatiations by the U.S. leaders upon "human rights" and
"the freedom of nations" and upon their "commitment" to de-
mocracy. Having committed heinous crimes in that small coun-
try the U.S. Administration has exposed itself before the whole
world as chief sponsor of the policy of international terrorism.
By ordering the landing of U.S. marines in Grenada, the U.S.
President trampled upon his grandiloquent declarations about
law and morals and equated the actions of his Administration
with terrorism and U.S. foreign policy with brigandage.'
In practical terms, the responses of states to terrorism have typ-
ically included legislation, adjudication, and reprisals. Space does
not allow for detailed exposition on the status of anti-terrorist legis-
lation in national law. Suffice it to say that a number of states have
enacted legislation purporting to prohibit terrorism. Such legislation
has sometimes included provisions for the imposition of sanctions,
e.g., United States against Libya, United States against Iran, and
Japan against North Korea.
106. Alexander, The Spiraling Price of Modern Terrorism, 51 AM. JEWISH CONG.
MONTHLY 22-23 (1984). It is probably little more than a smear to describe the Greenham
Common Women, the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament and those who protest deployment
of Euromissiles as involved with terrorism. Many of those protesters in fact practice
nonviolence.
107. See Losev, International Brigandage and Terrorism - Weapons of U.S. Imperial-
ism, INT'L AFFAIRS 12-19 (1984). See also Sovetov, Peace Built of Strength - A Doctrine of
International Terrorism, INT'L AFFAIRS (Moscow) 11 52-62 (1984); and Larin, CIA - A Ve-
hicle of International Brigandage and Terrorism INT'L AFFAIRS (Moscow) 6, 78-80 (1984).
The several plots to assassinate Fidel Castro, are from the Cuban and Soviet. standpoints,
obvious examples of state sponsored "terrorism." Given the prohibition against assassination of
foreign Heads of State, these acts arguably qualify as "terrorist" acts. See Alleged Assassina-
tion plots involving foreign leaders: An interim report of the select committee to study govern-
mental operations with respect to intelligence activities. United States Senate together with
additional supplemental and separate views: 94th Congress, First Session, 1976. E.O. 12,333
- 1975 prohibits assassinations of foreign heads of state. On the other hand, under the laws of
war military men are always subject to attack. In 1804-1805, Lt. Obanon led expeditions into
Libya against the Barbary pirates. In 1916, General Willoughby led a U.S. expedition into
Mexico to capture or kill Pancho Villa. In November 1941, there were Scottish attempts to
murder Rommel. Similarly, the U.S. attempted to murder Yamamoto. So too, the U.S. Boliv-
ian expedition which succeeded in killing Guevara in 1968. The Israeli attack on Abu Jihad on
April 16, 1988 should also be considered. Some might therefore argue that Castro was a viable
target and these attempts should not be classified as attempts at assassination.
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In terms of adjudication, courts have exercised jurisdiction
where terrorists have been caught or brought within the national ju-
risdiction, such as the recent conviction of the El Rukn by a Federal
District Court in Chicago on charges of conspiring to commit terror-
ist acts in the United States on behalf of Libya in exchange for 2.5
million dollars;108 and the extradition proceedings in the United
States District Court in Brooklyn in which Israel is asking the
United States to extradite Mahmoud el-Abed Ahmad, a suspected
member of the Abu Nidal terrorist organization, to stand trial for an
attack on an Israeli bus in which the-driver was killed and three
passengers wounded. 109 In other instances, courts have convicted and
sentenced terrorists in absentia. For example, on February 18, 1988,
an Italian court sentenced Abu Nidal in absentia to life imprison-
ment for his role in the Rome Airport massacre in 1985.110 Admit-
tedly, the latter judicial exercises have had little immediate practical
effect.
However, the law has undoubtedly had some limited overall suc-
cess in combatting terrorism; in 1986 the hijackers of the Achille
Lauro were tried and convicted in Italy; in 1987, George Abdalla
was tried and convicted in Paris for the murder of Lt. Col. Charles
Ray; the Tunisian authorities also arrested the Paris cafe bomber;
the Venezuelan authorities arrested the Italian bomber of the
Bologna Railway Station; and in October 1988, the Sudan sentenced
a number of terrorists to death, and a Maltese judge sentenced hi-
jackers of an Egyptian airline to twenty-five years imprisonment.
In terms of reprisals, a striking example is the United States
bombing of Libya. Israel and South Africa have also engaged in re-
prisals against activities which they consider "terrorist." Yet these
states are themselves considered "terrorist" by their adversaries. It is
worth recalling the words of Sir Humphrey Waldock more than
three decades ago, "armed reprisals to obtain satisfaction for an in-
jury or any armed intervention as an instrument of national policy
otherwise than for self-defence is illegal under the (U.N.) charter.
Another bombardment of Corfu would be a grave breach of the
Charter."' 1
There is finally, a fourth approach, that of the political compro-
mise; this is an approach few openly advocate because of its reper-
cussions, but pursued in secret by policy makers in some states. At-
tempts at buying cooperation from terrorists via the provisions of
108. Five Draw Long Sentences for terrorism Scheme, N.Y. Times, Dec. 31, 1987, at
A.15.
109. Id.
110. See Facts on File Yearbok 1988 at 116 E2.
Ill. Waldock, Regulating the use of Force by Individual States in International Law
Hague Recueil 1952 11, 493.
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safe-haven, protection, money, or arms have not worked because: ter-
rorists act when they want to, and there has been a proliferation of
terrorist groups. The results have been that the compromisers have
usually, at some point, moved into the camp of the anti-terrorists.
In sum, states have undertaken several measures to thwart in-
ternational terrorism. Most notable among these have been:
(i) enactment of legislation providing for arrest and detention of
suspected terrorists;
(ii) sanctions, including a ban on exports of arms and other mil-
itary equipment, and steps to prevent diversion of such material;
(iii) break in diplomatic relations;
(iv) reduction of the size of diplomatic and consular missions;
(v) expulsion of those suspected of terrorist offenses and com-
plicity in these;
(vi) tightened visa restrictions;
(vii) increased cooperation between police, intelligence and se-
curity forces, resulting in the exchange of relevant information, intel-
ligence and technical know-how;
(viii) judicial cooperation, as between the U.K. and the Repub-
lic of Ireland resulting from the Joint Law Enforcement Commission
permitting courts in both countries to try offenders on several serious
charges wherever apprehended; and
(ix) creation of special security forces; e.g., in the U.K., the
Special Air Services (SAS); in West Germany, the German Border
Patrol Group 9 (GSG 9); in Holland, the Marine Special Aid Unit
(BBE); in Italy, the Nucleo Operativo Centrale di Sicurezza
(NOCS).
In several instances, states have refused to consider the causes
of terrorism. At the European summit in 1986, George Schultz, then
the United States Secretary of State, opposed consideration of the
causes of terrorism. Schultz's approach is essentially the approach of
Cyclops. The military solution is the only solution. Perhaps high
drama, the headlines, and histrionics commend such a facile ap-
proach, but ultimately it accomplishes nothing. It would reduce us
all to spectators, a chorus, if you will, to a meaningless spiral of
violence in occupied and strife torn territories, a remorseless play in
which the victims of some only make victims of others. The upshot
would be that here a terrorist is killed, but another takes his place,
almost as if in response to Guevara's musing:
whenever death may surprise us it will be welcome, pro-
vided that this, our battle cry, reach some receptive ear, that
another hand be extended to take up our weapons, and that
other men come forward to intone our funeral dirge with the
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staccato of machine guns and new cries of battle and victory."'a
There a Dean Mitrionett 3 is kidnapped and executed; but imme-
diately, a new ambassador of United States imperialism takes his
place. Over yonder, the crack of someone's skull as some tyrant's
truncheon falls on some innocent head.
The position of the French Government in this matter, unlike
that of the United States, was that France would have liked the
United Nations to have reached a definition of acts of international
terrorism, and to have agreed to carry out a political study of the
causes of such acts. France's position was that the study of the
causes of terrorism, and, consequently, of the necessary measures to
prevent this, would not have ruled out condemnation and repression
of terrorist actions in accordance with national legislation. In this
vein, Francois Mitterand is reported as saying on August 17, 1982,
"what counts is the determination to roll back terrorism wherever it
lurks, to extirpate it by the roots." ' The Schultz approach by con-
trast is but a paradigm of historical shortsightedness and analytical
ineptitude.
In some respects, we may compare the Diplock Courts of
Northern Ireland with the Israeli Military Courts in the West Bank
where Arab lawyers have boycotted trials and Palestinians have
charged the army with arbitrarily applying its own laws. Both have
been almost universally condemned by those who advocate the rule
of law. With reference to the Israeli Military Courts, in both the
deportation and administrative detention procedures, the evidence
against the accused person may be declared secret. Defense lawyers
charge that this provision makes their job impossible. Under the mil-
itary occupation regulations in the West Bank and the Gaza, the
security officials determine which cases go to military courts.
In effect, these are court-martials applied to civilians. The law
adjudicated in a military court derives both from local law, which
depending on the circumstances, may be either Israeli or Jordanian,
and from the special security regulations ordered by the military au-
thorities. The court can be run by either one judge or a three-judge
panel. The judges and prosecutors are serving military officers. There
is no appeal.'
Several criticisms have been made of the Israeli military courts.
Suffice it to say that in addition to the above, the gist of these criti-
112. Guevara, Message to the Tricontinental (April 1967), CHE: SELECTED WORKS OF
ERNESTO GUEVARA 182 (1969).
113. U.S. Representative in "Stage of Seige" - Costa Gavras film.
114. Statement on International Terrorism provided by French Mission to the United
Nations. (Copy in editor's possession).
115. Arab Lawyers boycott the Israeli Military trials, N.Y. Times, December 31, 1987,
at A.6.
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cisms and recommendations have been as follows:
(1) these courts should curb administrative detentions;
(2) they should order improved prison facilities;
(3) they should, alternatively, release prisoners on reasonable
bail;
(4) they should give lawyers and defendants sufficient time to
prepare for trial;
(5) they should conduct trials in an impartial manner;
(6) they should administer fair and reasonable punishment pro-
portionate to the act or acts of each defendant; and
(7) they should eventually disband and transfer jurisdiction to
civilian courts with trained judges and juries made up of the defend-
ant's peers.
Israel, arguably, has some authority to restore order in the oc-
cupied territories. However, in this respect, it may well have used
more force than is reasonably necessary and acted in violation of
international human rights law. Proof of this was the fact that by
February 1988 the use of live ammunition by Israeli military forces
had resulted in the deaths of more than fifty Palestinians. The subse-
quent shift in policy from use of live ammunition to beatings, sum-
mary corporal punishment, and eventual uncontrolled excesses, such
as the live-burials of Palestinians, all fall below accepted interna-
tional human rights standards. A policy of breaking arms to prevent
them from throwing stones - with the Palestinians today, ironically,
cast in the role of David confronting Goliath - is at once evidence
of excessive force and constitutes a violation of Palestinian human
rights.
Although it might be argued that the current situation in the
Middle East is just short of undeclared war, a number of counter-
arguments can also be made. First, it might be objected that Israel,
as the initial aggressor and occupying power, cannot avail itself to
the claim of acting in self-defense. Second, Palestinian protests in
the occupied territories do not appear to have so threatened the loss
of life as to have justified repeated use of deadly force. Third, as a
subject people legally entitled to resist alien subjugation and domina-
tion, their acts do not appear to have been either unlawful, unreason-
able or excessive.
B. National Legislation
In the United States, Congress enacted the Omnibus Diplo-
matic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986. This Act extended
the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the United States to foreign na-
tionals involved in acts which injured United States citizens. An
amended Title 18 of the United States Code conferred jurisdiction
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on United States courts in cases where foreign nationals were prose-
cuted for involvement in acts of international terrorism, such as at-
tempting to kill, killing, assaulting, or making a violent attack upon
an American national. The legislation authorized the prosecution of
any terrorist found within United States territory, regardless of the
location of his offense. For jurisdiction, the Act only required that
the accused allegedly commit an act of terrorism against an Ameri-
can national. The Act might, however, be criticized as too broad and
too vague.11 What, for instance, would be the legal position where
an illegal arms dealer, a United States national who is violating the
United States and international arms embargo and sanctions against
South Africa, is apprehended and executed by the ANC "terrorists,"
or the position of pilots engaged in overflying Nicaragua, assisting
contra operations and even mining Nicaraguan harbors contrary to
Congressional legislation?
Technical gaps in the law may have protected terrorists in the
1960s and 1970s. United States laws were arguably inadequate with
respect to crimes committed outside the United States. Subse-
quently, attempts were made to fill the gaps. Administrations came
to embrace the idea of fighting terrorism through the rule of law.
International conventions required states to "extradite or prosecute"
(as per The Hague Convention on aircraft hijacking; the Montreal
Convention on aircraft sabotage; the Hostages Convention; the Dip-
lomats Convention; the Convention on Nuclear Materials). Failure
to extradite or prosecute was a breach of a state's international obli-
gations under the conventions.
The United States took part in drafting these conventions, and
also in recent developments in 1988, such as the Maritime Naviga-
tion Convention in Rome in March 1988 which resulted from the
Achille Lauro incident; the Protocol to the Montreal Convention;
and the Rome and Vienna massacres which had taken place in air-
ports, not aboard aircraft. A trend towards elimination of the Politi-
cal Offence Exception also emerged (e.g., United States - United
Kingdom extradition agreement). The parties involved believed that
this would strengthen the state's capability in fighting international
terrorism.
In domestic terms, House Bill 2776 (Berman-Hyde) 1 7 aimed to
prohibit export of arms to countries that support terrorism. It in-
volved reexamination of legislation designating countries sponsoring
116. Note, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction over Acts of Terrorism Committed Abroad:
Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 599
(1987).
117. Introduced by Representatives Howard Berman of California and Henry Hyde of
Illinois.
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terrorism. Under the Bill: (1) the country must have repeatedly sup-
ported terrorism; (2) the country must have harbored terrorists or
hijackers; and (3) reports to Congress would be increased. In March
1988, the Bill passed with two-thirds votes in the House, but died in
committee and did not reach the hearing stage in the Senate. The
Bill had run out of time, although it satisfied the Executive and Con-
gress. Failure to pass the Bill resulted from, among other things, the
absence of definition, a situation congenial to those who favor inser-
tion of a laundry list of offenses into the law in lieu of some rigorous
definition. It is perhaps novel, Congressional reliance on the law to
resolve international terrorism and the new cooperation between the
Executive and Congress in this area.
The United Kingdom Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Pro-
visions) Act 1984 granted to the Executive broad powers of arrest,
detention and exclusion. It proscribed the IRA and the INLA, made
contributions to acts of terrorism and withholding information about
acts of terrorism criminal offenses and gave the police powers to
carry out security checks on travellers. Opposition politicians criti-
cized the legislation as having made substantial inroads into civil lib-
erties an achieving little, since 95 % of those detained under the Act
were found innocent of any offenses and the government failed to
demonstrate that the other 5% would not have been caught without
this legislation on the statute books. It has also been argued that in
eroding basic civil liberties, the Act handed, free of charge, a victory
to those whose objective it was to destroy them." 8 By December
1987, it had been decided that police antiterrorist checks at air and
sea ports and police powers to arrest and detain suspected terrorists
should be the foundation of a new permanent Act when the PTA
expired in March 1989. Detention of suspected terrorists would,
however, be made subject to similar safeguards which apply at pre-
sent to people detained under the ordinary criminal law on suspicion
of having committed particular offenses." 9
The Repression of Terrorism Act in France provides for the
centralization of the examination procedure, the extension of the pe-
riod during which a suspect may be held before being presented to
an examining magistrate, more flexible conditions governing the
search of premises, and the possibility of encouraging the coopera-
tion of so-called "reformed characters." In addition, the restoration
of stricter visa requirements as of October 1986 and the assistance of
the armed forces in controlling the frontiers were intended to keep a
more satisfactory check on entries into French territory and to "cre-
118. Survey, March 1987 at 71.
I 19. Lord Colfield, Report on the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act
1984 HMSO Cmnd. 264.
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ate an extra factor of uncertainty and deterrence for terrorists." 1 0
By April 1987, the French Government had also moved to ratify the
European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism and the Dub-
lin Agreement with the necessary reservations with respect to the
traditional right to asylum and the principle prohibiting retroactive
application of the criminal law."'
Moreover, the Council of Ministers approved an amendment of
the Code of Penal Procedure relative to apprehension and adjudica-
tion of certain offenses committed abroad bringing French penal law
into line with the provisions of the European Convention and the
Dublin Agreement. The legislation envisaged that the French courts
henceforth would have jurisdiction over crimes committed abroad
when the authors of such acts and their accomplices were found in
France, and in cases where these crimes constituted acts of terrorism
within the meaning of the European Convention and not giving rise
to extradition notwithstanding a request for extradition by a State
Party to the Convention or the Agreement. 2
The basis for international cooperation in the fight against inter-
national terrorism is simply that there is no alternative. Examples of
international cooperation include: (1) high-level meetings (meetings
of foreign ministers and heads of state); (2) regular meetings of the
European Trevi group; and (3) ad hoc law enforcement meetings be-
tween United States and other officials to share information, track
and locate terrorists. These exercises form part of an expanding legal
net to allow states to act against terrorist overseas.
In addition to legislating, states have entered into a number of
bilateral agreements concerning, for example, the hijacking of air-
craft. These bilateral agreements seek to deter international terror-
ism. These agreements omit the "extradite or prosecute" formula
common in the multilateral conventions, but require the State Par-
ties to extradite the alleged offender if found, so that the offender
may be prosecuted in the state in which the offense was allegedly
committed. However, the obligation to extradite still remains subject
to the political offense exception in most domestic legal systems and
pragmatic political considerations. It is worth recalling that in the
Achille Lauro incident, Egypt violated the agreement and provided
transport for the terrorists; Italy allowed the leader Abu Abbas to
escape. A logical conclusion is that states will continue to ignore in-
ternational law if it does not suit their purposes.
120. Speech by French Prime Minister Jacques Chirac before the National Assembly on
October 8, 1986.
121. Communique of the Council of Ministers, April 9, 1987.
122. Id.
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C. International Responses
1. Global Conventions.-The assassination of Louis Barthou
and the King of Yugoslavia at Marseilles led to the adoption by the
League of Nations in 1937 of the first two conventions on the subject
of terrorism. One convention dealt specifically with terrorism. The
other dealt with the establishment of an international criminal court.
In some respects, little seems to have changed in the intervening
years.
The international community has so far adopted a number of
multilateral, antiterrorist conventions: The Convention on Offenses
and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft (Tokyo Con-
vention),123 The Convention for the Supression of Unlawful Seizure
of Aircraft (Hague Convention)," The Convention for the Supres-
sion of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation (Mon-
treal Convention), 25 The Convention on the Prevention and Punish-
ment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including
Diplomatic Agents (New York Convention), 2 6 and The Interna-
tional Convention Against the Taking of Hostages. 27
Furthermore, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Develop-
ment, Product and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and
Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction applies controls on weap-
ons of potential use to terrorists.128 Also, the Convention on the
Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (Convention on Nuclear
Material) 2 9 prevents parties from exporting or importing, or author-
izing the export or import of nuclear materials used for peaceful pur-
poses, unless they give assurances that such material will be pro-
tected at prescribed levels during international transport. The latter
also provides for international cooperation in the recovery and pro-
tection of stolen nuclear material, and requires states to make cer-
tain serious offenses punishable, and that states extradite or prose-
cute offenders.
The U.N. Convention Against the Taking of Hostages seeks to
123. Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft,
done at Tokyo, September 14, 1963, (1969) 20 U.S.T. 2941, T.I.A.S. No. 6768, 704 U.N.T.S.
219.
124. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
125. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
126. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally
Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, done at New York, Dec. 14, 1973, (1976-77)
28 U.S.T. 1975', T.I.A.S. No. 8532, G.A. Res. 3166, 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 146,
U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1974).
127. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
128. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, done at Washing-
ton, London, and Moscow, Apr. 10, 1972, (1975) 26 U.S.T. 583, T.I.A.S. No. 8062.
129. Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, done at Vienna, Oct.
26, 1979, opened for signature, Mar. 3, 1980, reprinted in 18 I.L.M. 1419, 1422-31 (1979).
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ensure that international acts of hostage-taking will be covered ei-
ther by the convention itself or by one of the applicable conventions
on the law of armed conflict. Hostage-taking is a "grave breach" of
the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to The Protection of Civilian
Persons in Times of War. The Hostages Convention may, arguably,
have also qualified the thesis that acts of terrorism are permissible if
committed as part of a war of national liberation. 130
These conventions seek to establish a framework for interna-
tional cooperation to prevent and punish international terrorism. Ac-
cordingly, the New York Convention, for instance, requires parties
to cooperate in preventing attacks on diplomats, to prepare for at-
tacks on diplomats within or outside their territories, to exchange
information, and to coordinate administrative measures against such
attacks. '31 States parties are to exchange information concerning the
circumstances of the crime, and the alleged offender's identity and
whereabouts. The state party where the alleged offender is found is
obliged to take measures to ensure his presence for purposes of ex-
tradition or prosecution, and to inform interested states and interna-
tional organizations of the measures taken.132 Parties are also to co-
operate in assisting criminal proceedings brought for attacks on
internationally protected persons, including supplying all relevant ev-
idence at their disposal.1 3
These conventions require a state party that apprehends an al-
leged offender in its territory to either extradite him or submit his
case to its authorities for prosecution. A legal basis for extradition is
provided either by the convention, or through incorporation of the
offenses mentioned in the convention into existing or future extradi-
tion treaties between the parties. To varying degrees, the conventions
also obligate the parties to take the important practical step of at-
tempting to apprehend the accused offender and hold him in custody.
These provisions mainly seek to ensure that the accused is pros-
ecuted. The obligation to submit the accused for prosecution is thus
expressly mandated by the conventions. In general, however, states
are not obliged to try the accused or to punish him, but to submit
the case for consideration by the appropriate prosecuting authority.
A judicial system which faces the threat of terror - for example, in
Columbia or one in a society in which the Executive is all powerful
- confronts the perils of possible intervention in the prosecution or
trial. Such intervention may ultimately prevent either the prosecu-
tion or even the extradition of the accused. On the other hand, it is
130. See Murphy, supra note 84, at 102.
131. Convention on Protected Persons, supra note 133, at art. 4.
132. Id. at art. 6.
133. Id. at art. 10.
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conceivable since Alabama Claims that states may be held responsi-
ble for acts originating within their territory. The 1917 United
States-Mexican operation, some Israeli attacks on the PLO, and the
United States bombing of Libya may well have been premised on
this argument.
Yet, even if the criminal justice system is relatively free of cor-
ruption, it may still prove difficult to obtain the necessary evidence
on which to base a prosecution when the alleged offense was commit-
ted abroad. This obstacle can be removed by cooperation among the
law enforcement agencies and the judiciary of friendly states. How-
ever, while the conventions create an obligation to cooperate, in the
case of unfriendly states, or states with different legal systems, such
as common law versus civil law systems, this obligation may still re-
main largely unfulfilled.
Such global conventions are not wholly ineffective in deterring
international terrorism. Much of the decline in aircraft hijacking
since the conclusion of the I.C.A.O. Conventions has probably been
due in part to the enhanced security techniques required by those
conventions. Hijackers have been prosecuted either in the states
where they have been found or in states to which they have been
extradited. It is unclear, however, whether these prosecutions can be
attributed to the terms of the I.C.A.O. Conventions. Expulsion and
deportation have both been utilized to return hijackers. The extradi-
tions which have occurred appear to have been effected pursuant to
bilateral treaties rather than to multilateral conventions. Prosecu-
tions for terrorist attacks on diplomats have also taken place, in
some cases under legislation enacted to implement a state's obliga-
tions under the United Nations Convention of Internationally Pro-
tected Persons.
These global conventions generally contain dispute settlement
provisions which allow for binding arbitration or adjudication, al-
though, in some cases, parties are allowed to "opt out" by virtue of
reservations made at the time of ratification. The United States
partly relied on such a provision in the United Nations Convention
on Internationally Protected Persons as the basis for its action
against Iran before the International Court of Justice. None of these
conventions contains provisions for economic or other sanctions
against states that offer safe haven or other assistance to terrorists.
Efforts in September 1973 to conclude an independent enforcement
convention for the I.C.A.O. Conventions at the Rome Security Con-
ference and at the I.C.A.O. Extraordinary Assembly were unsuccess-
ful. Other efforts to conclude an international sanctions convention
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met a similar fate. To date, only the Bonn Declaration,""' a non-
binding instrument, has been adopted.
The international community has thus responded to the problem
of terrorism in a number of ways. The U.N. General Assembly in
Resolution 40/61135 unequivocally condemned all acts, methods and
practices of terrorism wherever and by whomever committed. This
broad condemnation followed earlier international agreements such
as the conventions discussed above. After 1985, action was also
taken in furtherance of the recommendations of the fortieth General
Assembly, beginning with the adoption of Security Council Resolu-
tion 579.136 Progress was also made in the International Maritime
Organization on the problem of terrorism aboard or against ships
and in the International Civil Aviation Organization on a new in-
strument concerning acts of violence at airports. The increase in the
number of States parties to the existing conventions and efforts by
the International Civil Aviation Organization to promote acceptance
of and strict compliance with the existing conventions were also in
furtherance of the recommendation contained in Resolution 40/61.
It is worth noting that United Nations resolutions routinely pro-
claim that some acts are so heinous that nothing justifies them. First,
these assertions never specify which particular acts are referred to.
Therefore, in terms of prospective penal legislation, a future defend-
ant would arguably not know what exactly he was charged with.
Second, the resolutions leave unanswered the question of what are
the victims of similar "unjustifiable," "heinous" acts to do in the
absence of effective legal mechanisms capable of punishing such
behavior.
International society still remains divided among states with op-
posing interests. Above all, three factors help to explain the develop-
ment of international terrorism. First, international frontiers offer
terrorists eventual refuge. Second, international tension furnishes
terrorists with many causes to embrace. Finally, the extraordinary
development of international trade, traffic, communications and ex-
changes offers terrorists an inexhaustible list of targets. The interna-
tional community therefore had to react. It responded by concluding
half a dozen conventions, all in force.
The international response to terrorism has been based on the
realization that it is necessary to reduce terrorism in all of its forms.
These agreements have often been reached under the pressure of
events. The law concerning terrorism has developed more from the
desire of states to defend themselves than from any well-considered
134. See infra note 141.
135. See supra note 24.
136. 39 U.N.Y.B. 1170-1171 (1985).
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or well-defined strategy. It seems that states have mainly paid lip-
service to the ideal of cooperation against terrorism rather than to
vigorously pursue the legal control of terrorism. Formation of the
law relating to terrorism reflects its empiricism. The rule never pre-
cedes criminal behavior, never anticipates it, and is hardly ever con-
cerned with the existence of other legal instruments in force, and
their possible relevance. It has been limited to condemning terrorism
and the elaboration of conventions keep pace with terrorist activity.
The international response has thus been above all defensive, ad
hoc and presupposes a public international order which never evi-
denced uniform state practice. Yet, if the responses have been legal,
the basic questions have remained political. Terrorists threaten do-
mestic public order and the national security of states reluctant to
share their exclusive jurisdiction in these matters. International ter-
rorists know this and play adroitly on these differences. The situation
is, in terms of domestic law, relatively simple. However, at the inter-
national level the situation becomes more complex since it is often
possible to identify divergent interests among the states and parties
involved at each stage. The intervention of international law is there-
fore indispensable even if only to reconcile divergent interests.
The need to condemn terrorism allowed states to conclude trea-
ties criminalizing terrorism. But to condemn is not to conquer. To
agree that something is anathema is not in any way to guarantee
that its punishment is effective. Most attempts at regulation have so
far excluded consideration of the causes and the prevention of terror-
ist acts. In this light, the use of law and the inadequacy of the ex-
isting sanctions against terrorism are better understood. It is neces-
sary to note that the international community has reacted against
terrorism in a legalistic framework, as evidenced by the adoption of
the various conventions. Enforcement, however, has not reduced the
threat of terrorism, and the ineffectiveness of the legal framework
for handling terrorism has been quite clear.
2. Regional Conventions.-There are three major regional
conventions: the European Convention on the Suppression of Terror-
ism (The European Convention)," 7 The Agreement on the Applica-
tion of the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism
(The Dublin Agreement), 138 and The Organization of American
States Convention to Prevent and Punish the Acts of Terrorism Tak-
ing the Forms of Crimes Against Persons and Related Extortion that
are of International Significance (The OAS Convention).1 39 These
137. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
138. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
139. The Convention to Prevent and Punish the Acts of Terrorism Taking the forms of
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Conventions also seek to ensure that terrorists will be either extra-
dited or prosecuted.
The OAS Convention has been largely superseded in scope, cov-
erage and importance by the United Nations Convention on Interna-
tionally Protected Persons. That the European Convention and the
Dublin Agreement do not attempt to define terrorism is itself evi-
dence of the fact that the problem of definition has remained the
main stumbling block facing the international community. Instead,
they list offenses - such as those under the I.C.A.O. Convention
and the United Nations Convention on Internationally Protected
Persons, as well as kidnapping, hostage-taking, and the use of certain
lethal weapons - in an effort to exclude them from the political
offense exception in the extradition treaties between the states
parties.
The European Convention sets out to make it easier to extradite
those accused of "terrorist" offenses to the country in which the of-
fenses were allegedly committed. In this respect, it challenged a
well-established practice of granting asylum and protecting refugees.
However, while Article I of the Convention purported to eliminate
the listed offenses from the political offenses exception, Article 13
permitted a state party to make reservations to Article I:
Provided that it undertakes to take into due consideration,
when evaluating the character of the offense, any particularly
serious aspects of the offense including: (a) that it created a col-
lective danger to the life, physical integrity or liberty of persons,
or (b) that it affected persons foreign to the motives behind it; or
(c) cruel or vicious means have been used in the commission of
the offense.
The Dublin Agreement attempts to tighten the application of
the European Convention's extradite or prosecute formula in two
ways. First, under the Agreement,"' member states of the commu-
nity accept the proposition that extradition proceedings between two
member states of the Community apply in full (i.e., without reserva-
tions) even if one or both of the states are not parties to it, or if one
or both have made the political offense reservation. Second, the
Agreement seeks to restrict still further the effect of such reserva-
tions between member states of the Community. Reservations made
to the European Convention therefore will not apply in extradition
Crimes Against Persons and Related Extortion that are of International Significance, Feb. 2,
1971, (1971) 27 U.S.T. 3949 T.I.A.S. No. 8413, O.A.S. T.S. No. 37, at 6, O.A.S. Off. Doc.
OEA/Ser. A/17. Resolution 4, adopted by the O.A.S. General Assembly on June 30, 1970, in
its first Extraordinary Session strongly condemned acts of terrorism and especially the kidnap-
ping of persons and extortion connected with this delict, as crimes against humanity.
140. The Dublin Agreement, supra note 18 at arts. 1-3.
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proceedings between European Community member states, unless a
further declaration is made to this effect. Also, parties to the Dublin
Agreement that are not parties to the European Convention are re-
quired to indicate by declaration if they wish to retain the political
offense exception in extradition proceedings between Community
member states.
None of the multilateral antiterrorist conventions provide for ec-
onomic or other sanctions against states which offer safe haven or
other assistance to terrorists. Efforts to include an independent en-
forcement convention have failed.
3. Bonn Declaration.-As a partial substitute for a sanctions
convention, the Heads of State and Government of the Seven Sum-
mit Countries (Canada, United States, Great Britain, West Ger-
many, France, Italy and Japan) meeting in July 1978 in Bonn, is-
sued the so-called Bonn Declaration."" This Declaration represented
a political commitment. The signatories agreed to halt bilateral air
traffic with countries which refuse to extradite or prosecute hijackers
or refuse to return aircraft, passengers and crew. Follow-up efforts
succeeded in obtaining widespread support for the Declaration and
in inducing additional countries to become parties to the I.C.A.O.
Conventions.
So far, the Declaration has been invoked on one occasion. On
December 1, 1982, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of
Germany, and France implemented the Bonn Declaration and termi-
nated all air traffic with Afghanistan. Some controversy remains as
to whether the Bonn Declaration can be implemented consistently
with the obligations of the Summit Countries and other states under
the International Air Service Transit Agreement, the Convention on
International Civil Aviation, and bilateral aviation agreements.
Moreover, given the history of sanctions, their application is unlikely
to succeed in deterring terrorism.
The issue of terrorism has been regularly discussed at the Sum-
mit Conferences of the Industrialized Countries. It was discussed at
the Bonn and Ottawa Summits in 1978 and 1981. Recrudescence of
terrorist acts led to further discussions on the subject at the Tokyo
Summit in 1986. These summits have normally achieved little more
than a ritualistic condemnation mingled with pledges of consultation
and cooperation with regard to terrorism. Such consultations appear
generally to have left each country, on the basis of its own responsi-
bilities, in full control of its foreign policy options and actions.
As of December 6, 1986, the European Economic Community
141. The Bonn Agreement on Hijacking of 1978, reprinted in 17 I.L.M. 1285 (1978).
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agreed that the common fight against terrorism and those who sup-
ported terrorist acts should be governed by the following principles:
- no concessions made to terrorists or to those who support
them.
- solidarity between the member nations in their efforts to
prevent terrorism, and in their efforts to bring terrorists before
the courts.
- action devised in answer to terrorist attacks on the terri-
tory of a member state and to evidence of foreign participation
in those attacks.
The government leaders confirmed the decisions made by
the twelve representatives in answer to evidence of support given
by certain states to terrorism. The government leaders congratu-
lated themselves on the intention of the French, Greek, and Irish
governments to ratify the European agreement on the suppres-
sion of terrorism . ...
In terms of practical measures to be taken by the ministers con-
cerned, the EEC asked the ministers of the interior to agree on the
following:
- the extradition system
- the measures taken in the fight against the theft and
falsification of passports
- the examination of the role of the possible coordination
and harmonization of the Visa system in the strengthening of
inspection on borders of EEC countries.
- the intensification of cooperation in the measures aimed
at the prevention of illegal immigration.
III. Conclusion
Efforts at regulating terrorism so far illustrate one central fact:
the lack of balance between our conception of terrorism as applied
by the individual practitioner and our conception of terrorism as
practiced by government officials. The balance seems weighted in
favor of governments even in those pathological cases where the pa-
tients had been rather unceremoniously treated for their allergies to
dictatorship. Government in some cases control, in others influence,
the sources of information concerned with national security. Stigma-
tization of sometime legitimate resistance - labelling it as "terror-
ist" - deprived such protests of legitimacy and protection. The peo-
ple in power, the governments of the day, then had a free hand to
deal with domestic opposition as they wished.
Yet, in a sense, these internal wars - in Haiti, in El Salvador,
in Guatemala, in South Africa and elsewhere - are perhaps analo-
gous to the blood-letting so commonplace in medieval physiology.
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The artifices of Moliere's day, they were considered a painful, if not
evil necessity, curative of ill, humor and ultimately restorative of the
body's constitution. It is no doubt scant satisfaction to be murdered
by terrorists, either of the left or of the right, but to the partisans
who today protest and die at the hands of the security forces and
their death squads in Haiti, El Salvador and elsewhere, there will
perhaps come some day the recognition of having paid the ultimate
price in having rendered the constitutions of their bodies politic,
more just, more equitable, more balanced and more fair. Their mar-
tyrdom, no less than that of those patriots who fell during the War
for American Independence, will in the final analysis have been a
witness of bitter necessity, spurring political change, enhancing
wider political participation, enlarging the democratic process, ulti-
mately restorative of good health to the central American and Carib-
bean bodies politic. These "terrorists," "brigands," "mobs," "protes-
tors," "freedom fighters," will ultimately be absolved by history.
They will be recognized for what they were - foot soldiers in the
march for democracy.
In the face of palpable injustice, the "terrorist" then, is Every-
man; he is in a literary sense like Musset's doppelganger, "un
etranger vetu de noir, qui me ressemblait comme un fr6re."' 42 Like
Calvino's Cloven Viscount, he is, the dissident within us all, a man
at war with himself, a political Jekyll and Hyde.14 For all that, he is
a natural in a Hobbesian state of nature; his appeal to arms but a
passionate, if ill-conceived cry of the heart.
Terrorism, then, is nothing more than old wine in new bottles.
Perhaps we fear that terrorists might gain control of nuclear weap-
ons, or come to possess equally devastating chemical or bacteriologi-
cal weapons, causing additional imponderables to further complicate
an already uncertain military and political balance, and creating un-
told risks for civilian populations everywhere. 4 But, states which
some consider "terrorist," such as South Africa and Israel, already
possess nuclear capability. Iran and Iraq, among other "terrorist"
states, already possess and have employed chemical weapons. Terror-
142. Mussee, "La Nuit de Decembre," OEUVRES COMPLETES 153 (1963), literally "a
stranger dressed in black who resembled me like a brother" (author's translation).
143. See I. CALVINO, THE CLOVEN VISCOUNT, (tran A. Colquhoun 1962). A practical
example - Dr. Rasmi Awad, a Jordanian,
a respected Madrid physician, practiced medicine for years in Madrid
where he lived with his family in a fashionable neighborhood. But, leading his
double life, he also organized Abu Nidal attacks throughout Western Europe.
By the time his agents actually set off their bombs, he would be back in Madrid
attending to his patients.
Carley, Lifting the Lid: Their Secrets Revealed, Abu Nidal's Terrorists are Becoming
Targets, Wall St. J., Oct. 15, 1987.




ism then, and the threat of it, is nothing new. Circumstances have
changed - the obvious example being nuclear weapons - but terror
as a feature of state policy and of groups contesting government
edict and control seems to have remained a constant in national and
international life. Novelty, if it exists, lies only in the circumstances
in which terrorism is exercised and the methods which terrorists
would employ.
As Meron Benevisti pointed out with regard to the tragedy of
Palestine:
the lessons . . . have not been learned neither by Israelis
nor by Palestinians. But soon there will be a repeated perform-
ance, and the civil war will explode in yet another cycle of vio-
lence. The curtail is thus raised on a new act of the old tragedy.
Unlike earlier acts, it is supported almost exclusively by the two
tragic heroes. All supporting actors have withdrawn. The two
heroes conduct a dialogue of horrifying deeds. The tired audi-
ence prays that the tragedy is close to its catharsis, but the ac-
tors insist on prolonging the agony. Not all scores have been set-
tled. Darkness envelops the strife torn landscape of the Holy
Land. The shadows of rage and fear are deepening. 45
Terrorism remains the bete noire of conservatives everywhere.' 46
It is perhaps the easiest of targets, a source of cheap political capital
for the forces of law and order. For all that, conventional responses
in political, military, economic and legal terms have to date proven
woefully inadequate. No one individual response has proven ade-
quate by itself. There are no easy quick-fix solutions, military or oth-
erwise. What has been labelled the "scourge of terrorism" can only
be allayed by comprehensive solutions which address the underlying
political and socio-economic inequities which give rise to terrorism in
the first place. For terrorism is but another act in the drama of polit-
ical development. It may well be that at a later day, we shall look
back on it in a spirit akin to that with which we now regard the
Alien and Sedition legislation of the late eighteenth century; legisla-
tion which deeply stirred the passions of the day, but subsided
quickly thereafter without discernible impact on subsequent history.
If these wars of national liberation with their acts of "terrorism" are,
as has been argued in this article, like the bloodlettings of Moliere's
day, then the comprehensive approach espoused here is in the nature
145. Benevisiti, New Act, Old Tragedy, N. Y. Times, January 3, 1988 at E15.
146. Leaving aside First Amendment issues, the glib nonsense parroted Rep. Jack
Kemp, typifies this sort of ideological exploitation, e.g. "The Bill (i.e., the Bill Requiring Clo-
sure of PLO's Washington & U.N. offices) sends a message to the PLO that the United States
supports a peaceful resolution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, and rejects terrorist as inadmissible
parties of negotiations." See Bill Requiring Closure of PLO's Washington, U.N. Offices May
Be Propaganda Blow to U.S., Wall St. J. Dec. 24, 1987, at 28.
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of a prophylactic, a preventative medicine preferable to the present
ad hoc, reactive approach which treats the recurring symptom in-
stead of the disease.
